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ABSTRACT 
 
Knowledge Protection and Partner Selection in R&D Alliances. (August 2005) 
Dan Li, B.S., Beijing University; M.S., Tsinghua University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Lorraine Eden 
                                                            Dr. Michael A. Hitt 
 
 
This dissertation investigates three sets of research questions. First, how can 
partner selection be used as a mechanism to minimize R&D alliance participants’ 
concerns about knowledge leakage? And what is the nature of the relationship among 
partner selection and two previously-studied protection mechanisms – governance 
structure and alliance scope? Extending this research question to the international 
context, the second set of research questions asks how international R&D alliances differ 
from their domestic counterparts in partner selection to protect their participants’ 
valuable knowledge, and how different types of international R&D alliances vary in this 
regard. Distinguishing bilateral from multilateral R&D alliances, this dissertation 
examines a third set of questions about how multilateral R&D alliances differ from 
bilateral ones in partner selection for the purpose of protecting participants’ 
technological assets. Hypotheses are proposed and tested with a sample of 2,185 R&D 
alliances involving companies in high technology industries.  
Results indicate that the more radical the innovation an R&D alliance intends to 
develop, the more likely the alliance will be formed between Friends than Strangers. 
However, under the same situation, firms are less likely to select Acquaintances than 
Strangers. A substitution effect was detected among partner selection, governance 
 
 iv
structure, and alliance scope used by firms to protect their valuable technological assets 
from being appropriated in R&D alliances. In addition, no empirical support was found 
for different partner selection preferences for firms forming domestic R&D alliances 
versus international R&D alliances. However, results show that firms, when forming 
trinational R&D alliances and/or traditional international R&D alliances, are more 
likely to select their prior partners than when forming cross-nation domestic R&D 
alliances. Moreover, this study shows that when an R&D alliance is formed by multiple 
companies, partner firms are more likely to be prior partners. I argue that concerns about 
knowledge leakage explain this result.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Much of the world economy centers on intellectual property where the major 
growth industries are knowledge intensive industries such as microelectronics, 
biotechnology, and telecommunications (Thurow, 1997). For companies such as 
Microsoft, the basis for competitiveness resides in their technological and intangible 
assets, rather than their vast pool of tangible assets. Therefore, fighting to defend and 
extend the domain of their intellectual property is the way modern companies compete in 
the global economy.  
Research and development (R&D) alliances, in particular, have become a 
popular vehicle for building and leveraging technological capabilities for firms operating 
in fast-paced and knowledge-intensive environments (Duysters & Hagedoorn, 1996; 
Narula & Duysters, 2004). In such alliances, partners pool their resources and 
capabilities to develop new technologies that they cannot develop on their own. 
However, while enjoying access to their alliance partners’ technological assets, firms 
also put their own valuable knowledge at risk of appropriation. Thus, firms need to find 
the right balance between maintaining open knowledge exchange to further the 
technological development goal of the alliance, and controlling knowledge flow to avoid  
______________ 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Academy of Management Journal.   
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unintended leakage of valuable technological assets (Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000; 
Oxley & Sampson, 2004).  
Previous research has suggested two solutions to protect firms’ valuable 
technological assets in R&D alliances. For example, transaction cost theorists suggest 
that the selection of a proper governance structure, or organizational form, can promote 
knowledge sharing and protect core technological assets from being appropriated by 
opportunistic partners (e.g., Pisano, 1989; Oxley, 1999). Specifically, equity-based 
governance structures are likely to provide better protection than non-equity-based 
structures. This is because the equity investments create a mutual hostage situation for 
the partners, hopefully preventing them from behaving opportunistically (Hennart, 1982; 
Teece, 1992).  Other scholars suggest adjusting the scope of R&D alliances to control 
knowledge leakage (e.g., Khanna, 1998; Oxley & Sampson, 2004).  Alliance scope 
decisions involve whether to restrict cooperation to R&D collaboration or extend it 
vertically to include manufacturing and/or marketing. When the costs of knowledge 
leakage are deemed to be particularly high, alliance scope can be narrowed to limit 
knowledge exposure. 
However, there are circumstances in which even the most protective alliance 
forms and the most restricted alliance scope do not reduce leakage concerns sufficiently 
to ensure the appropriate level of knowledge sharing required to achieve the objectives 
of an R&D alliance.  In this dissertation, I suggest the selection of a prior partner is an 
alternative, third way to control the threat of knowledge leakage and retain the firm’s 
core technological assets in an R&D alliance.  
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I argue there are three types of potential partners in an alliance: Friends, 
Acquaintances and Strangers. I define Friends as firms that have had repeated alliance 
collaborations in the recent past. Friends not only know each other but have built high-
level trust through their interactions.  Acquaintances are firms that have engaged in a 
single alliance in the recent past. Acquaintances have accumulated some knowledge 
about each other, but trust may or may not have been established. Hence, the distinction 
between Acquaintances and Friends is based on the number of shared prior alliances, 
and therefore on the implicit degree of trust established through these prior alliances. I 
define Strangers as firms that have never been alliance partners. 
Partner selection has important implications for the extent to which alliance 
partners expose valuable knowledge to each other. In circumstances where the costs of 
knowledge leakage are perceived to be high, one might expect that only Friends will be 
selected to limit knowledge appropriation. I develop these ideas in more detail later in 
this dissertation and identify the circumstances that are more likely to lead to the 
selection of prior partners (i.e., Friends or Acquaintances) in new R&D alliances, as a 
means to protect technological assets. I argue that the hazards of knowledge sharing will 
be most salient when the innovations to be developed are radical and/or the external 
protection of intellectual properties is weak.  Both circumstances promote firms to 
carefully consider whether to select prior partners to protect their valuable knowledge 
from being appropriated.  I further explore the extent to which the selection of prior 
partners, alliance scope and governance choices act as substituting mechanisms for 
protecting technological assets in R&D alliances. That is, when the R&D alliance is 
 
 4
governed by a protective structure and/or when it has a very narrow scope of joint 
activities, the need for selecting a trustworthy partner may not be as salient, and vice 
versa.  
Research question 1.1: How do innovation radicality and intellectual 
property protection affect firms’ partner selection as a mechanism to protect 
their technological assets in R&D alliances? 
Research question 1.2: What is the nature of the relationship among partner 
selection, governance structure and alliance scope as alternative means for 
firms to protect technological assets in R&D alliances? 
After generally analyzing knowledge protection and partner selection in R&D 
alliances, this dissertation carries the research to two specific types of R&D alliances – 
international R&D alliances and multilateral R&D alliances. Two more sets of research 
questions are pursued.  
In general, R&D tends to stay “at home” (Kumar, 2001; Narula, 2002). 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that R&D activity abroad has grown relative to its level 
20 years ago (Narula & Duysters, 2004). Firms expanded fast internationally to exploit 
and acquire assets and technology that may be specific to particular locations. While 
there are many reasons for firms to move their R&D activities abroad, international 
R&D alliances are risky.  Prior studies have shown that technology flows to nearby 
locations are greater and faster than flows to more distant locations (e.g., Jaffe & 
Trajtenberg, 1993; 1999). Involving partner firms from different national backgrounds, 
international alliances are perceived to represent complex inter-firm relationships. It has 
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been well accepted that international alliances pose additional risks due to political, 
public policy, economic, and social uncertainty (Brouthers, 1995). Therefore, the 
perceived risk of opportunism is higher in international than domestic alliances 
(McCutchen Jr., Swamidass, & Teng, 2004).  Due to the lack of trust resulting from 
different national backgrounds, alliance partners have more concerns about knowledge 
leakage for their international R&D alliances than domestic ones. This dissertation 
examines how the international component of an R&D alliance complicates firms’ 
partner selection in the context of knowledge protection.  
Research question 2.1: How do domestic R&D alliances differ from 
international ones in firms’ partner selection for the purpose of protecting 
their technological assets? 
The international alliance literature has focused on two parent alliances formed 
between one foreign firm and one local firm. However, other types of alliances exist. I 
differentiate three distinct forms of international alliances based on the alliance partners’ 
nationality. Specifically, this study defines partner nationality in terms of whether the 
international R&D alliance is formed by foreign-, local-, or third country-based firms. A 
cross-national domestic R&D alliance (DRDA) is an R&D alliance formed between 
foreign -based firms in the local market; and the home countries of foreign-based firms 
are the same. A traditional international R&D alliance (IRDA) is an R&D alliance 
formed between a foreign-based and a local-based firm. A trinational international R&D 
alliance (TRDA) is an R&D alliance formed between foreign-based firms in the local 
market; and the home countries of foreign-based firms are different. Therefore, three 
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nationalities are involved in a TRDA. Considering the complexity involved in each type 
of international R&D alliance from the perspective of cultural difference (both 
organizational and national cultures), I examine the differences in partner selection 
among these three types of international R&D alliances for the purpose of knowledge 
protection.
Research question 2.2: How do cross-border domestic, traditional 
international, and trinational R&D alliances differ in firms’ partner 
selection for the purpose of protecting their technological assets? 
Multilateral alliances have gradually emerged in many industries such as 
software development, communication, and pharmaceuticals (Gomes-Casseres, 1994).  
Compared to the conventional two-firm alliance, the multi-firm alliance is a single, 
large, overarching relationship joined by several companies for a common purpose.  
Several published articles have provided evidence for the prevalence of multilateral 
alliances. For instance, in the large database of 2,471 alliances from multiple industries 
and countries compiled by Gulati (1995a), twenty-seven percent of these alliances are 
reported to be trilateral alliances. In a related database used by Gulati and Singh (1998), 
about one-third are multilateral alliances, out of 1,570 alliances in the 
biopharmaceutical, new materials, and automobile industries.  
While there is no doubt that multilateral alliances have the same value creation 
logic as bilateral alliances, “greater numbers of participants also complicate alliance 
design and governance” (Doz & Hamel, 1998: 224).  In R&D alliances, concerns 
regarding knowledge leakage are higher when more partners are involved. This is 
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because when more than two partners are involved, the reciprocal exchange disappears 
and the direct monitoring of partners’ behaviors becomes more difficult. Drawing on 
social exchange theory, this dissertation analyzes how multilateral R&D alliances differ 
from bilateral ones in partner selection for the purpose of knowledge protection. 
Research question 3: How do multilateral R&D alliances differ from 
bilateral ones in firms’ partner selection for the purpose of protecting their 
technological assets? 
Figure 1.1 offers a summary of the research questions investigated in this 
dissertation. 
OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH METHODS 
Theory and hypotheses developed in the present study are tested by using a 
sample of 2185 R&D alliances involving companies in high-technology industries from 
1994 through 2003. The selection of this sample for the present study comes from both 
theoretical and pragmatic concerns. Theoretically, firms in high-technology industries 
are ideal for a study of R&D alliances. Survival and profitability in these high-
technology industries are critically dependent on a firm’s ability to create and 
commercialize innovations quickly. Therefore, firms establish R&D alliances at an 
unprecedented rate, as a way to spread the risk and cost of technological development. 
Pragmatically, the sample ensures the availability of the data needed to test the theory 
and hypotheses generated.  
 
 FIGURE 1.1.  
Research Questions 
 
Chapter IV: Partner Selection in International 
R&D Alliances 
 
Question 1: How do domestic R&D alliances differ 
from international ones in firms’ partner selection for 
the purpose of protecting their technological assets? 
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Question 2:  How do cross-border domestic, traditional 
international, and trinational R&D alliances differ in 
firms’ partner selection for the purpose of protecting 
their technological assets? 
Chapter III: Partner Selection in R&D 
Alliances 
 
Question 1: How do innovation radicality 
and intellectual property protection affect 
firms’ partner selection as a mechanism 
to protect their technological assets in 
R&D alliances? 
 
Question 2: What is the nature of the 
relationship among partner selection, 
governance structure and alliance scope 
as alternative means for firms to protect 
technological assets in R&D alliances? 
Chapter V: Partner Selection in Multilateral R&D 
Alliances 
  
Question 1: How do multilateral R&D alliances differ 
from bilateral ones in firms’ partner selection for the 
purpose of protecting their technological assets? 
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Data are collected from various archival sources, the most important of which is 
the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Database on Alliances and Joint Ventures. The 
SDC database contains information on all types of alliances, compiled from publicly 
available sources such as SEC filings and their international counterparts, trade 
publications, wires, and news sources. Although the coverage of alliances is still far 
from comprehensive, this database currently represents one of the most comprehensive 
sources of information on alliances.  
A multinominal logistic analysis is selected to test the hypotheses concerning 
determinants of partner selection in R&D alliances, and a three-stage least squares 
analysis is selected to test the hypotheses concerning the substituting effects among 
partner selection, alliance scope and governance structure. T-tests are used to compare 
partner selection differences between domestic and international R&D alliances and 
across three sub-categories of international R&D alliances. Finally, multinominal 
logistic regression models are employed again to compare multilateral against bilateral 
R&D alliances.  
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study contributes to our understanding of firms’ alliance formation decision 
processes. First, the analysis suggests that managers can and do pay attention to the 
competitive implications of the potential loss of control of technological assets that 
comes with cooperation in R&D alliances. These considerations play a role in the design 
of R&D alliances.  Although the point that partner selection is important for alliance 
formation and management has long been made (Tomlinson & Thompson, 1977; e.g., 
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Geringer, 1991), it has rarely been implemented in prior empirical work. Instead, the 
most common empirical approach has been to “take-partners-as-given” and test the 
performance outcome of other decision variables such as governance structure. In this 
study, I am able to examine why firms select prior partners for the purpose of protecting 
their proprietary assets in R&D alliances, by focusing on the process rather than simply 
the outcome.  
Second, this study enriches our understanding of trust between alliance partners. 
The literature has traditionally employed prior interaction as a proxy of trust. However, I 
argue that there is a clear distinction between Acquaintance and Friend, at least in the 
context of technology protection. Firms with knowledge about Acquaintances as result 
of a one-time alliance may or may not have established the trust towards them; whereas, 
through multiple alliances, Friends are those that firms can really trust. Such a 
differentiation is more salient when close interaction is needed for R&D collaborations. 
To protect their valuable technological assets, firms tend to select their Friends as 
partners for new R&D alliances, while trying to avoid Acquaintances which can 
appropriate their technologies more easily than Strangers. The empirical analysis offers 
support for such arguments.  
Third, examination of the dynamic process of alliance formation enables us to 
understand how the three decision variables – who (partner selection), how (alliance 
governance), and what (alliance scope) – substitute for each other when firms form R&D 
alliances. Although preliminary, the analysis suggests that this is a line of inquiry with 
potentially important implications for the theory and management of inter-firm alliances.  
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This work contributes to an emergent research stream aimed at understanding the 
relationship between strategy and efficient economic organization. Firms that are able to 
benefit from R&D collaboration and at the same time effectively protect their own 
valuable knowledge are those that will maintain their competitive advantage and succeed 
in market competition.  
Fourth, the present study provides evidence that non-conventional forms of 
international R&D alliances are frequently occurring and are important organizational 
forms. This study also provides a comparison of different types of international R&D 
alliances in terms of their implications for partner selection when there are knowledge 
protection considerations. It does so by introducing a new typology that looks at 
international R&D alliances formed by (1) foreign firms from the same home country; 
(2) foreign firms from different home countries; and (3) a foreign and a local firm. This 
research demonstrates that cross-nation domestic R&D alliances are the most modest 
scenario with the lowest knowledge leakage concerns, and therefore are less likely to be 
formed between firms that enjoy high levels of trust than trinational and traditional 
international R&D alliances. The in-depth analysis of various types of international 
R&D alliances enriches our understanding of how to protect participants’ valuable 
knowledge in R&D collaboration across borders.  
Lastly, my examination of multilateral R&D alliances helps to clarify key 
exchange processes in alliances, and contributes not only to the literature on partner 
selection but also to the larger body of literature on alliances. When the number of 
partners increases, the knowledge leakage concerns in R&D alliances are more serious. 
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Such a complicated inter-firm relationship has not been analyzed in previous studies. 
This dissertation fills the research gap by analyzing partner selection as a mechanism to 
protect partner firms’ technological assets in bilateral and multilateral R&D alliances 
from the perspective of social exchange theory.  
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Relevant research 
streams about partner selection for R&D alliances, international R&D alliances, and 
multilateral alliances are reviewed in Chapter II. The chapter points out both 
contributions and limitations of previous research on R&D alliance partner selection, 
and sets the stage for the theoretical framework developed in Chapters III, IV and V. In 
Chapter III, a theoretical framework of partner selection for R&D alliances in the 
context of knowledge protection is developed.  Chapters IV and V extend the analysis of 
partner selection to international and multilateral R&D alliances, which have been 
growing rapidly during the past two decades. Hypotheses are presented in Chapters III, 
IV and V.  The empirical analysis follows in Chapter VI, which provides a description of 
the research methods, sample selection, measurement issues, and statistical techniques 
used. Chapter VII displays the results of the empirical tests for the hypotheses generated 
in Chapters III, IV and V. Chapter VIII presents discussion of the results reported in 
Chapter VII. The dissertation ends with Chapter IX on implications of research and 
practices and limitations of the study. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The overall objective of this chapter is to provide a review of extant research and 
demonstrate the limitations of previous alternative theories and models vis-à-vis the 
present study. The first section reviews theories and empirical evidence of how 
traditionally argued mechanisms (i.e., governance structure and alliance scope) can be 
utilized to protect participants’ valuable technological assets in R&D alliances. The 
second section reviews the literature on partner selection and discusses how partner 
selection fits within the system of alliance formation decisions in industries where 
valuable knowledge must be protected. The third and fourth sections review relevant 
literature on international and multilateral alliances, respectively.  
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE, ALLIANCE SCOPE AND KNOWLEDGE 
PROTECTION  
The number of R&D alliances has been increasing rapidly over the past years 
(Duysters & Hagedoorn, 1996; Narula & Duysters, 2004). This upsurge is explained by 
several reasons, such as the fast rate of technology change, the increasing complexity 
and high costs of developing new products and technologies, and the advantages of early 
market entry.  Regardless of the motivation, alliance managers have to face the challenge 
of finding the right balance between knowledge sharing and knowledge protection in 
R&D alliances. It is true that external protection of intellectual property through 
copyrights and patents exists and is effective in many countries. For instance, companies 
such as Intel have large legal budgets to defend what they think is their property; 
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meanwhile, they are accused of aggressively attacking what others think is theirs to 
create uncertainties, time delays and higher start-up costs for their competitors (Thurow, 
1997). However, external protection is only an ex post remedy rather than ex ante 
prevention. External protection can only take effect once the appropriation of intellectual 
property takes place.  
 To address their concerns about knowledge leakage in R&D collaborations, 
managers need to take precautionary steps during the process of forming alliances. 
Designing a protective governance structure and narrowing alliance scope are two 
solutions offered by prior literature. For instance, firms can design a protective 
governance structure, such as an equity-based joint venture, to create a mutual-hostage 
situation to reduce the chance of their partners’ opportunistic behaviors (e.g., Hennart, 
1982; Pisano, 1989; Teece, 1992; Oxley, 1999). In such a mutual-hostage situation, 
losses from opportunism will be shared by both partners. Alternatively, firms can limit 
the contact points with their partners by restricting joint activities. That is, they choose a 
narrower alliance scope for the R&D collaboration rather than combining R&D with 
other vertical operations (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). 
Governance Structure and Knowledge Protection in R&D Alliances 
Prior research in transaction cost theory has suggested that choosing an 
appropriate governance structure is one mechanism that firms use to promote knowledge 
sharing and protection in an alliance (Pisano, Russo, & Teece, 1988; Pisano, 1989; 
Oxley, 1997; Kale et al., 2000). Although transaction costs, broadly defined, encompass 
a wide range of elements, the basic thrust of the transaction cost argument as applied to 
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strategic alliances builds on Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) discussion of team production 
and focuses on appropriation concerns of team players. Such appropriation concerns 
originate from the pervasive presence of uncertain behaviors by partners, combined with 
the difficulties of specifying intellectual property rights, and by the challenges of 
contractual monitoring and enforcement (Oxley, 1997). In discussing hierarchical 
governance structure, transaction cost economists typically focus on its agency features, 
which they view as addressing appropriation concerns through control mechanisms such 
as fiat, providing monitoring, and aligning incentives (Williamson, 1975, 1985). 
Hierarchical structures are thus thought to be more applicable when concerns of 
appropriation are potentially high. More hierarchical controls provide greater incentive 
alignment than fewer hierarchical controls (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Klein, Crawford, 
& Alchian, 1978). 
According to this logic, researchers have linked the anticipation of appropriation 
concerns when the alliance is formed with the specific governance structure used to 
formalize the alliance. It has been suggested that the greater the potential concerns, the 
more hierarchical the contract used (Pisano et al., 1988; Pisano, 1989; Oxley, 1997). For 
instance, Williamson (1975) claimed that “legal ordering” incentives such as shared 
ownership of specific investments can be used to restrain opportunism and safeguard 
future profits yielded by cooperation (Axelrod, 1984; Heide & Miner, 1992). Other 
transaction cost theorists, such as Hennart (1982; 1991) and Teece (1986), suggested that 
equity joint ventures offer “mutual hostage” positions to avoid opportunistic behaviors 
by partner firms. Empirical evidence for such explanations of alliance structure has been 
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provided by Pisano (1989) in a study of the biotechnology sector, by Pisano, Russo, and 
Teece (1989) in a study of the telecommunications sector, and by Oxley (1997) in a 
study of many different industries and countries.  
However, the benefits of equity-based alliances must be weighed against their 
disadvantages (Gulati, 1995a). Equity-based alliances typically take a longer time to 
negotiate and organize than non-equity-based alliances and involve very high exit costs. 
Further, the administrative costs can be associated with the hierarchical supervision they 
encompass. Equity-based R&D alliances are even more expensive than other types of 
joint ventures. Prior research has suggested that transactions involving the sharing, 
exchange, or co-development of knowledge can be rather problematic because of the 
public goods nature of knowledge (Johnson, 1970; Arrow, 1974; Contractor & 
Wonchan, 2002). Many problems result from the difficulties of accurately assessing the 
value of the knowledge being exchanged as well as concerns on opportunism. High 
failure rate caused by the difficulties of transferring knowledge across organizational 
borders also compounds these problems. Therefore, equity-based R&D alliances usually 
involve more costs than other equity-based alliances with no joint R&D.   
Alliance Scope and Knowledge Protection in R&D Alliances 
The second solution offered by the literature is to craft a narrower alliance scope 
in the face of higher risks of appropriation.  
The concept of alliance scope is relatively new in the alliance literature. Alliance 
scope is “one of the most important tasks partners will undertake… The partners must 
establish boundaries of geography, product categories, customer segments, brands, 
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technologies and fixed assets between the new entity and the parents. They must identify 
the activities in which the alliance may engage and those reserved for the parents.”  (The 
Alliance Analyst, July 5, 1997: 5). Such choices of which activities to include within an 
alliance are considered central by managers.   
Khanna and colleagues (Khanna, 1998; Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998)  
provided the earliest theoretical analysis of alliance scope and its potential effect on the 
dynamics of technology-related alliances. Khanna et al. (1998) introduced the concept of 
the “relative scope” of a firm within an alliance to precisely measure the extent of 
activities in markets unrelated to the alliance as a proportion of all activities conducted 
by firms. The relative scope of a firm in an alliance j, is the ratio of the scope of the 
alliance to the total number of product markets in which the firm is active. The ratio lies 
between 0 and 1. Its value is closer to 0 if the scope of the alliance is very small, and its 
value is 1 if the firm has no interests in markets not covered by the alliance. Thus, the 
relative scope is a measure that is particular to a given firm in a given alliance. Different 
firms in the same alliance and the same firm in different alliances would have different 
relative scope values.  
Such conceptualization of alliance scope indicates the extent of the partner firms’ 
control. Of the markets in which two firms have mutual interests, they can choose which 
activities to include in the alliance and which to exclude. The choice of alliance scope 
affects the nature and timing of the benefit streams that occur to alliance participants 
(Khanna, 1998; Khanna et al., 1998) and, therefore, alliance scope can play a key role in 
understanding a range of issues related to alliances.  
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However, Khanna’s conceptualization of alliance scope is multidimensional and 
abstract. Oxley and Sampson (2004) pointed out that many aspects of alliance activities 
(e.g., the number of product categories or customer segments involved, or the dollar 
value of a joint project) are not reported by alliance participants and so are unavailable 
through secondary data sources such as an alliance announcement in the press. 
According to Oxley and Sampson, this may explain the dearth of prior research on 
alliance scope.  
Considering conceptual clarification and data availability, Oxley and Sampson 
(2004) re-defined alliance scope by focusing on the functions of alliance activities. 
Alliance scope is the extent to which the partners combine multiple and sequential 
functions or value chain activities within the alliance1, such as R&D, manufacturing 
and/or marketing. An increase in the vertical scope of an alliance predictably exacerbates 
the complexity of the collaborative challenge, all else being equal (Reuer, Zollo, & 
Singh, 2002). Pragmatically, Oxley and Sampson (2004) in their empirical settings 
focused attention on a simple measure of vertical scope that is particularly relevant to 
                                                 
1 Here is an example from Arino, A., & de la Torre, J. 1998. Learning from failure: Towards an 
evolutionary model of collaborative ventures. Organization Science, 9(3): 306-325. 
NAMCO and Hexagon formed an equity-based alliance in 1991. NAMCO is a U.S.-based company which 
is active in a number of segments of the household products industry, including cleaning products, 
toiletries, and personal hygiene. Hexagon is a French-based company with high product diversity in three 
main fields: specialty chemicals, cosmetics, and pharmaceuticals. Despite its diversity, Hexagon has a star 
branded product in its “Hexa” cosmetic line – Hexa-Care line of hypoallergenic skin care product. As their 
alliance was first formed, NAMCO was engaged mainly in the distribution of Hexa-Care, whereas most 
manufacturing and packaging operations was carried out by Hexagon.  That is, Hexagon would contribute 
to the JV its current product formulas, and any further product developments solicited by the JV would be 
performed by Hexagon’s laboratories and charged back to the JV on a cost-plus-incentive basis. One year 
later, NAMCO suggested that a different manufacturing process, one that would allow its distributors to 
perform production and packaging functions, and not only distribution, would motivate them to push 
Hexa-Care more forcefully. As a result, Hexagon’s board members agreed with this proposal.  
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R&D-related alliances, i.e., comparing alliances that involve R&D activities alone 
against those that combine R&D with other activities, specifically manufacturing and/or 
marketing. They explained that this is because an evaluation of horizontal scope is a 
much more subjective and challenging exercise. The ‘horizontal’ scope of activities, 
related to the size, complexity, and uncertainty of the particular project, also 
undoubtedly varies within functional areas and across alliances. In contrast to vertical 
scope, these project-specific features cannot be ascertained from available secondary 
reports of alliance events.  
When the vertical scope of an R&D alliance is increased to encompass other 
activities, the extent of knowledge sharing and coordination inevitably rises (Reuer et 
al., 2002). Therefore, protection of technological assets becomes more challenging with 
increases in alliance scope, as the tacit knowledge embedded in operating routines must 
be exposed to alliance partners if joint operations are to proceed efficiently. To jointly 
bring an R&D project through to commercialization requires many more points of 
contact between the partner firms, with a concomitant reduction in control over 
information flows across the relevant organizational boundaries (Teece, 1992).  
Moreover, operational routines exhibit substantial inseparability, and it is likely 
that knowledge gained in the course of manufacturing and marketing efforts within the 
alliance will have important effects on other areas of partner firms’ operations. As a 
result, it is almost impossible to effectively manage mixed activity R&D alliances 
without extensive sharing of tacit knowledge embedded in operational routines, which in 
turn may have significant effects on the relative competitive position of partner firms. 
 
 20
Oxley and Sampson’s (2004) study of 208 R&D alliances has shown that an alliance 
scope decision is an important aspect of alliance management. Decisions to restrict 
alliance scope are made as a response to the elevated leakage concerns associated with 
knowledge sharing in particular competitive contexts.  
PARTNER SELECTION AND KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION 
Managers need to ask whom to ally with (partner selection) in addition to the two 
questions - how to allocate responsibilities and authority between partners (governance 
structure) and what activities to perform (alliance scope). To prevent partners’ 
opportunistic behaviors, firms can choose partners that they can trust, rather than those 
about which they have no knowledge. Below, I will first review the literature on partner 
selection and then on the interrelationships among governance structure, alliance scope 
and partner selection.  
Partner Selection in General 
Partner selection is defined as the decision to enter in an alliance with a potential 
partner. Partner selection is based on the desire by the initiating firm to undertake 
particular alliance project with one or more partners. Such a selection decision considers 
how favorable or unfavorable the partner choice will be, and how attractive, valuable 
and correct the choice will be for the initiating firm (Geringer, 1991; Hitt et al., 1995; 
Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002). 
Partner selection is the first difficult but critical decision that firms encounter, 
after they decide on employing a strategic alliance strategy (Hitt et al., 1995; Ireland et 
al., 2002). Rationales for careful partner selection are readily evident both in the 
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academic literature and the practitioner literature. Partner selection is important because 
the choice of a partner(s) may influence the “overall mix of available skills and 
resources, the operating policies and procedures, and the short- and long-term viability” 
of the cooperative relationship (Geringer, 1991: 55-56). As documented by scholars 
(e.g., Lane & Beamish, 1990; Hill & Hellriegel, 1994), selecting the right partners 
requires significant amounts of executives’ time and resources.   
Partner selection is difficult.  The “heart of darkness” in strategic alliances is the 
conflict between partners, and such bitterness usually stems from the difficulty of 
finding the right/proper partners (Davies et al., 1989; Lane & Beamish, 1990).  The 
significant amount of time and effort senior managers spend in finding the appropriate 
partner(s) for their alliances has been documented by scholars, such as Lane and 
Beamish (1990) and Davies et al. (1989). In many cases, partnering firms would have 
been better off not to enter an alliance with a given partner than to deal with the 
aftermath of a failed relationship. Questions have been frequently asked by practitioners; 
for instance, what a firm can do to minimize the chances of alliance failure or how the 
firm can better manage the alliance process over the life cycle of an alliance.  
Prior literature has proposed solutions, although limited, to minimize the chances 
of alliance failures. Most of the solutions are based on the similarity between partners; 
firms need to select partners similar to them to minimize the potential conflicts with their 
partners in the collaboration. For instance, Daniels (1971) examined foreign direct 
manufacturing investment in the U.S. and concluded that firms sought those of similar 
sizes as their partners. The rationale was that by selecting a partner of its similar size, a 
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company could be assured that the two firms placed about the same importance on the 
joint venture (JV) and the two firms were in relatively equal power positions for 
bargaining.  Yan and Gray (1994) conducted a comparative case study and found that the 
bargaining power of potential partners affected the structure of management control, 
which, in turn, affected JV performance. Hitt et al. (1997) and Brouthers et al. (1995) 
argued that, for effective partner selection, partners must have compatible strategic 
intents, i.e., their strategy, goals, and purposes  need to be compatible.  The difference in 
strategic intents caused conflicts, not only administratively but also strategically. 
Therefore, an alliance is more likely to fail if it does not advance both partners’ strategic 
intents.  Evidence supporting such arguments were reported in studies by Dymsza (1988) 
and Lorange and Roos (1992). Fey and Beamish (2001) and Zeng (2003) found that the 
similarity in partners’ organizational cultures and management styles led to a higher 
degree of cooperation among partners. Partners must also possess commensurate levels 
of risk (Brouthers et al., 1995). With commensurate levels of risk, alliance partners are 
willing to commit themselves in the cooperative relationship and a cooperative culture in 
the alliance is likely. Commensurate levels of risk can be particularly problematic when, 
for example, a well-established company approaches a small firm. 
Another solution to minimize the chances of alliance failure is to form alliances 
with prior partners. “We prefer to work with a few biotech companies we know well 
over the years rather than reinvent new alliance and new relationships,” says Dr. dintan 
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Walton, CEO of ParmaVentures2 (Lam, 2004). Specific to R&D alliances, alliances with 
prior partners not only ease knowledge transfer but also reduce the hazards emerging 
from potential opportunistic behaviors due to the trust established. First, improved 
absorptive capacity from prior interactions smoothes the technology exchange between 
alliance partners (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1992; Szulanski, 1996; Mowery, Oxley, & 
Silverman, 1998). Absorptive capacity is the ability of a firm to recognize the value of 
new external information, and in turn, assimilate and apply it to commercial ends to 
enhance the firm’s innovative capabilities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).  A common 
theme in previous literature on absorptive capacity is that prior interactions between 
technology transferring partners are critical for efficient and effective technology flow 
from one party to the other. For instance, both Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Kogut 
and Zander (1992) argue that absorptive capacity is based on history and thus is path 
dependent. The stickiness of knowledge and the causal ambiguity surrounding 
knowledge transfer can be reduced and overcome through repeated interactions between 
the knowledge source and the recipient (von Hippel, 1994; Szulanski, 1996; Kale et al., 
2000).  The benefits of smooth technology exchange become more salient when the 
technologies exchanged in the R&D cooperation are more sophisticated. Recent research 
by Zahra and George (2002) also points out that prior interactions facilitate the 
transformation of potential absorptive capacity (which is comprised of knowledge 
acquisition and assimilation capabilities) to realized absorptive capacity (which centers 
on knowledge transformation and exploitation). These arguments are consistent with 
                                                 
2 PharmaVentures is a UK-based company that helps biotechnology companies make deals including 
strategic alliances, licensing, joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions and equity financing. 
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what Burt (2003) called the “information side” of social capital. That is, prior social 
interactions enhance firms’ absorptive capacity and smooth the progress of technology 
exchange. 
Second, prior alliance experience between firms can generate trust between 
alliance partners (Gulati, 1995a). The social capital between firms generated through 
their previous alliances supplies the mutual confidence that neither party will exploit the 
other’s vulnerabilities (Sabel, 1993). In the context of technology protection, the biggest 
concern of firms entering R&D alliances is the predictability of their partners’ behaviors. 
Although partners can specify what is core to each party and develop formal conduct 
codes to restrict behaviors that lead to the appropriation of valuable technological assets, 
such codes are difficult to write and typically incomplete. Given the public goods nature 
of knowledge (Johnson, 1970; Arrow, 1974; Contractor & Wonchan, 2002), it is 
impossible for each party to fully specify their core technologies. Even if partner firms 
can clearly draw the boundary of their proprietary assets, a complete contract is 
impossible to write beforehand, particularly in R&D alliances where intense interaction 
and exchange of knowledge are required to achieve the goal of developing new 
technologies. Therefore, trust is necessary for the parties to make a good-faith effort not 
to take excessive and unilateral advantage of each other, even when the opportunity is 
available. Moreover, through earlier alliances, jointly held social capital may also affect 
exchanging partners’ managerial philosophies. For partner firms, decisions and 
behaviors conform to standards because they have been internalized as principles and 
values (Barney & Hansen, 1994). An exchange partner behaves in a trustworthy manner 
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because to do otherwise would be to violate their values, standards, and principles of 
behavior.  
Partner Selection, Governance Structure and Alliance Scope 
The three questions – how, whom and what – are interrelated in that each 
decision choice is likely to affect the other two decisions (see Figure 2.1).  
Prior research has suggested that an R&D alliance formed between partners with 
no trust or low-level trust increases the possibility of opportunism (Gulati, 1995a). 
Therefore, firms need a more protective governance structure, such as that afforded by 
an equity joint venture, and/or a narrower alliance scope, such as that provided by an 
exclusive R&D collaboration. In contrast to this literature, I view partner selection as an 
alternative “third way” for controlling partner opportunism. I expect firms to be more 
cautious in partner selection when the R&D alliance is based on a contractual 
relationship and/or when the alliance scope is broad. Hence, the set of three decisions 
represents a complex, dynamic, and endogenous system. 
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FIGURE 2.1. 
Decision Triangle for R&D Alliance Formation 
 
How 
(governance) 
 
 
When analyzing how to protect valuable knowledge from leakage in an R&D 
alliance, the extant literature has tended to focus on selecting a secure governance 
structure and, most recently, on narrowing the alliance activity scope.  The selection of 
partners has always been treated as exogenous. Little attention has been paid to partner 
selection as a decision variable, despite the repeated reminder that partner selection is 
the first critical decision in alliance formation (see, for example, Koot, 1988; Geringer, 
1991; Brouthers et al., 1995; Hitt et al., 1995; Ireland et al., 2002). I argue that selecting 
prior partners is an alternative mechanism to ease the concern of knowledge leakage in 
an R&D alliance. The basic rationale for selecting a prior partner is that two firms with 
prior alliances are likely to know and trust each other more than other firms with whom 
they have had no alliance experience (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). I discuss in more 
detail later whether this proxy is proper, but the general agreement in the literature is that 
Who What 
(partner selection) (alliance scope) 
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trust should exist between prior partners. Therefore, trust may prompt firms to form 
R&D alliances with prior partners in order to avoid high risks of knowledge leakage. 
KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL R&D ALLIANCES 
As pointed out above, R&D tends to stay “at home” (Kumar, 2001; Narula, 
2002). Therefore, the trend of increasing R&D activities abroad, particularly 
international R&D alliances, is worth noting (Narula & Duysters, 2004). As Figure 2.2 
shows, intra-European cooperation has lagged behind EU-US alliances.  
FIGURE 2.2.  
Number of New Strategic Technology Partnerships for EU Firms, by Partner 
Nationality  
 
 
Notes: Adapted from Narula & Duysters (2004a: 205). 
           EU = European Union 
           US = United States 
           JPN = Japan 
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The literature has suggested that moving R&D abroad is due to both demand and 
supply issues. The demand issues are well known, and are generally associated with 
adaptive R&D in response to specific market conditions. That is, international R&D is 
motivated to adapt and tailor products for foreign markets and provide technical support 
to offshore manufacturing operations (Vernon, 1966, 1977; Abernathy & Utterback, 
1978; Utterback, 1989; Dunning, 1995; Doz & Hamel, 1998; Kuemmerle, 1999). 
Recently, attention has been increasingly drawn to the supply issues (Cantwell, 1989; 
Casson, 1991; Archibugi & Michie, 1995; Kummerle, 1997). Firms expand fast 
internationally, as they are able not only to exploit their technological assets in various 
markets simultaneously, but also to acquire technological assets that may be specific to 
particular locations. International R&D is designed to obtain and internalize new 
knowledge that can be diffused throughout the organization. The supply-side factors 
have been increasingly important in motivating and shaping international R&D activities 
(Florida, 1997).  
No matter whether the international R&D is motivated by demand or supply 
considerations, forming international R&D alliances is one of the major ways to develop 
and/or acquire technological assets across national borders.  Firms conducting 
international R&D seek to utilize technological assets, which may be either firm specific 
or location specific (Narula, 2002). In the case where these technological assets are firm 
specific, they are often associated with clusters of firms, and country-specific 
characteristics. It is well acknowledged that location advantages are idiosyncratic and 
path dependent, and the nature of innovative activities in a given location is associated 
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with the national systems of innovation (Lundvall, 1992; Edquist, 1997). The nature of 
the benefits arising from a noncooperative arrangement require physical proximity to the 
firm or cluster, to seek indirect technology spillovers, which can be a highly costly, 
uncertain and random procedure that requires a long-term horizon. Where such 
immobile assets are country but not firm specific, they may be embodied in aspects of 
the national systems of innovation. Whether the advantage being sought is firm or 
country specific, the establishment of a greenfield laboratory is a feasible option, but 
start-up involves high costs and considerable time. In fields where innovation is rapid it 
may not provide a fast-enough response (Narula, 2002). 
Despite the many reasons for firms to form R&D alliances abroad, international 
R&D alliances are complicated and risky.  Prior studies have shown that technology 
flows to nearby locations are greater and faster than flows to more distant locations (e.g., 
Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 1993; 1999). Because they involve partner firms from different 
national backgrounds, international alliances are perceived as complicated in terms of 
inter-firm relationships. It has been well accepted that international alliances pose 
additional risks for partner, because of political, public policy, economic, and social 
uncertainty (Brouthers, 1995). Both the complicated business environment and 
unfamiliarity between alliance partners lead to a higher perceived risk of opportunism in 
international than domestic alliances (McCutchen Jr. et al., 2004).   
As a result, alliance partners should have more concerns about knowledge 
leakage for their international R&D alliances than domestic ones. Such concerns may be 
reflected on their cautious selection of alliance partners. However, the prior literature on 
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international alliances has not addressed the comparison between domestic and 
international R&D alliances regarding partner selection as a potential mechanism to 
protect alliance participants’ technological assets.  
The risks related to international R&D alliances are even more complicated when 
considering the nationalities of partners involved. The international alliance literature 
has focused on two-parent alliances formed between one foreign firm and one local firm. 
However, other types of alliances exist. I differentiate among three distinct forms of 
international alliances based on the alliance partner nationality. Specifically, this study 
defines partner nationality in terms of whether the international R&D alliance is formed 
by foreign-, local-, or third country-based firms. A cross-national domestic R&D 
alliance (DRDA) is an R&D alliance formed between foreign -based firms in the local 
market; and the home countries of the foreign-based firms are the same. A traditional 
international R&D alliance (IRDA) is an R&D alliance formed between a foreign-based 
and a local-based firm. A trinational international R&D alliance (TRDA) is an R&D 
alliance formed between foreign-based firms in the local market; and the home countries 
of the foreign-based firms are different. That is, three nationalities are involved in a 
TRDA. Figure 2.3 provides a summary and also a visual illustration of such a 
categorization. 
 
 FIGURE 2.3.  
International R&D Alliance Typology from a Nationality Perspective 
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It is clear that, in the sequence of DRDA, IRDA, and TRDA, the complexity 
resulting from partner nationality increases. Generally speaking, firms are different from 
each other even if they are from the same home country; such differences are even 
greater if they are from different countries. While participating R&D alliances, partner 
firms’ concerns of knowledge leakage should grow with the increasing complexity 
involved. In this dissertation, I examine the differences in partner selection among these 
three types of international R&D alliances, from the perspective of cultural differences. 
KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION IN MULTILATERAL R&D ALLIANCES 
It is necessary to first define a multilateral alliance. Das and Teng (2002) 
distinguished between two broad types of interfirm partnerships: strategic alliances and 
alliance networks. A strategic alliance is a cooperative arrangement involving two or 
more firms, such as in equity joint ventures, joint R&D, and joint production; whereas, 
an alliance network is a collection of several alliances. A strategic alliance is a single 
arrangement that includes two or more firms, and an alliance network includes several 
alliances. For example, Anderson, Hakansson, and Johanson (1994) defined a business 
network as “a set of two or more connected business relationships, in which each 
exchange relation is between business firms that are conceptualized as collective actors” 
(p. 2).  Whetten (1981) similarly noted that “a network consists of all interactions 
between organizations in a population” (p. 8). Thus, an alliance network consists of at 
least two alliances, each with two partners or with multiple partners. 
A multilateral alliance is a strategic alliance formed by at least three partner 
firms. The term “multilateral alliance” has been used in Gulati (1995a), Gulati and Singh 
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(1998) and Doz and Hamel (1998); other terms have also been used in prior literature – 
“multiple partner alliance” in Gomes-Casseres (1994), “multi-firm alliance” in Hwang 
and Burgers (1997), and “constellation” in Das and Teng (2002). Figure 2.4 illustrates 
the differences among bilateral alliance, multilateral alliance, and alliance network. The 
multilateral alliance is formed by four firms (A, C, D, and E). All these entities and 
relationships together constitute an alliance network (A, B, C, D, E, Bilateral 1, Bilateral 
2, and Multilateral). 
FIGURE 2.4.  
Bilateral Alliance, Multilateral Alliance, and Alliance Network  
 
DA 
CB 
Multilateral E Bilateral 1 
B
ilateral 2
Notes:  Adapted from Das and Teng (2002: 447) 
Individual firms: A, B, C, D, and E 
 Bilateral alliance: Bilateral 1 (A + B) and Bilateral 2 (B + C) 
 Multilateral alliance: Multilateral (A + C + D + E) 
 Alliance network: A + B + C + D + E +Bilateral 1+ Bilateral 2 +Multilateral 
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There is no doubt that multilateral alliances have the same value creation logic as 
bilateral alliances; however, “greater numbers of participants also complicate alliance 
design and governance” (Doz & Hamel, 1998: 224).  Cooperation has both an economic  
dimension and a social dimension (Blau, 1964).  When the number of alliance partners 
increases, economic exchanges between partners are complicated because explicit 
contracts are even more difficult to write to govern the multilateral relationships. 
Therefore, social exchanges play a more central role under such conditions characterized 
by incomplete contracts and reciprocal exchanges of resources (Das & Teng, 2001). 
However, social exchanges are even more complicated than economic ones when the 
number of alliance partners increases.   
Social exchange theorists distinguish between restricted and generalized social 
exchanges (Levi-Strauss, 1969; Ekeh, 1974). Restricted social exchange occurs when 
two parties directly exchange favors with each other, which is also known as a dyadic or 
mutual exchange. In contrast, generalized social exchanges take place among a group of 
at least three parties, and there is no direct reciprocity among them. In other words, what 
A receives from B is not contingent upon what A gives to B. Examples of generalized 
exchanges can be seen in the cooperative arrangements that farmers make to help each 
other out with harvesting chores and in the library consortia organized by local 
universities. The lack of one-to-one correspondence between the giver and the receiver is 
a key feature. 
There are a number of important differences between restricted and generalized 
social exchanges (Blau, 1964; Ekeh, 1974; Gillmore, 1987; Molm & Cook, 1995; 
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Takahashi, 2000). First, given that reciprocity is voluntary, both restricted exchanges and 
generalized exchanges are subject to significant risks of opportunism. However, because 
restricted exchanges entail direct reciprocity between two parties, accountability is 
relatively high and opportunistic behaviors relatively easy to detect and remedy. By 
comparison, the risks are more prevalent in generalized exchanges (Takahashi, 2000). In 
multiparty (or generalized) exchanges, where A gives to B, B to C, and then C to A, A 
often does not have information about reciprocity between B and C. Thus, given the 
ambiguity and disjointed nature of exchanges, members of a generalized exchange 
system have more incentives for opportunism. Second, because of the considerable risks 
of opportunism, members involved in social exchanges have a high need for trust. Trust 
among exchange members reduces anxiety and allows reciprocity to take place over 
time. The need for trust is particularly high in generalized exchanges, because these 
exchanges are carried out by multiple parties that do not reciprocate with each other in a 
direct manner.  
Multilateral R&D alliances, having at least three partner firms, are based on 
generalized exchanges and, thus, share the salient features of such exchanges, such as a 
higher risk of opportunism and a higher need for trust (Das & Teng, 2002). Therefore, 
partner firms’ concerns about knowledge leakage are more serious in multilateral than 
bilateral R&D alliances. However, no studies have examined how partner firms’ 
technological assets are protected in multilateral R&D alliances. This dissertation fills 
the research gap by investigating how partner selection, as a mechanism of knowledge 
protection, can be utilized differently in multilateral from bilateral R&D alliances. 
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SUMMARY  
The present chapter reviews several closely related topics on R&D alliances and 
reaches several conclusions.  First, knowledge protection in R&D alliance has important 
implications to the chances of alliance success. Prior researchers have proposed two 
mechanisms to promote knowledge protection. When knowledge leakage concerns are 
high, firms select to utilize protective governances and/or narrow alliance scope to avoid 
possible appropriation of their valuable technological assets. Although partner selection 
has been studied in previous literature, relevant research is incomplete and analyses of 
partner selection as a mechanism to protect knowledge in R&D alliances have not been 
completed. Second, while the general discussion on prior partner has been conducted in 
the recent strategy literature, the distinction among different types of prior partners has 
not been made. The literature has pointed out that alliances with prior partners not only 
ease knowledge transfer but also reduce the hazards emerging from potential 
opportunistic behaviors. However, both being prior partners, Acquaintances and Friends 
have noticeably different implications under various R&D collaborating situations. Such 
a distinction between Acquaintances and Friends has not been clarified in the literature. 
Third, as mentioned, researchers have proposed two mechanisms – governance structure 
and alliance scope – to protect partner firms’ technological assets. With the third way 
(i.e., partner selection), no study has examined how these three play their roles 
simultaneously and what the relationships are among these three mechanisms. Fourth, 
international and multilateral R&D alliances have been on the rise. There are plenty of 
practical reports on the increasing complexity of R&D alliances. R&D alliances are 
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increasingly formed abroad or between partners from different countries; with the 
competitive landscape becoming more intense, firms have been engaging in R&D 
alliances formed among multiple partners. However, academic research has not caught 
up with these new phenomena, and knowledge protection in these R&D alliances has not 
been investigated.  
In the analysis below, I fill these research gaps by exploring how partner 
selection can be used as a means to protect knowledge in R&D alliances and by 
discussing how firms’ partner selection decisions may be altered in different types of 
R&D alliances (international and multilateral).
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CHAPTER III 
KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION AND PARTNER SELECTION IN R&D 
ALLIANCES 
In this chapter, I first define different types of prior partners and generally 
discuss how firms make choices among Strangers, Acquaintances and Friends for R&D 
alliances. This is followed by an analysis of firms’ selection of prior partners as an 
alternative way to protect their core technologies in R&D alliances. I also explore the 
nature of the relationship between partner selection, governance structure and alliance 
scope as alternative means for firms to protect knowledge resources in R&D alliances. 
Figure 3.1 summarizes the major theoretical arguments addressed in this chapter, which 
I develop below.  
STRANGERS, ACQUAINTANCES, AND FRIENDS 
I argue that a firm can choose from among three types of potential alliance 
partners − Strangers, Acquaintances, and Friends − as determined by their prior 
partnerships. The typical dictionary definition of a stranger is someone who is unknown 
to you. Therefore, I define Strangers as potential alliance partners that are unknown to 
each other. I assume they are unknown to each other if they have not been prior partners 
in an earlier strategic alliance. The dictionary definition of an acquaintance is someone 
you know and have some knowledge about. Therefore, I define Acquaintances as 
potential partner firms that know each other because they have been prior partners in one 
and only one earlier strategic alliance. A friend is typically defined as someone you  
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FIGURE 3.1.  
Conceptual Framework (Chapter III) 
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explicit measure, implicitly I assume the number of prior partnerships is a proxy for the 
extent of trust involved between the potential partner firms. Repeated interaction has 
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have not had prior alliances (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Similarly, Parkhe (1993) 
observes that a prior history of cooperation between firms limits their perception of 
expected opportunistic behavior in new alliances. 
Numerous definitions of trust have been presented in the literature (e.g., Bradach 
& Eccles, 1989; Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998). I adopt Sabel’s (1993) definition of 
trust, for its suitability to the discussion of my topic, as the mutual confidence that no 
party to an exchange will exploit another’s vulnerabilities. Being vulnerable implies that 
there is something of importance to be lost; therefore, making oneself vulnerable is 
taking risk (Gambetta, 1988).  Trust is a willingness to take such risks (Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995). While trust is the mutual confidence that one’s vulnerabilities will 
not be exploited in an exchange, the degree of trust varies between different exchange 
partners under various situations. Consistent with prior research (Parkhe, 1993; Gulati, 
1995a), I argue that trust between prior partners (i.e., Friends and/or Acquaintances) is 
greater than trust between Strangers because of the existing interactions between prior 
partners.  
I distinguish between Friends and Acquaintances based on the extent of trust 
established via earlier collaborations. Strong-form trust exists between Friends that share 
a unique history of interactions (Barney & Hansen, 1994).  With strong-form trust, 
partners are trustworthy independent of whether or not exchange vulnerabilities or 
governance mechanisms exist. However, for Acquaintances, a single prior alliance at 
best provides sufficient information about the prior partner to generate weak-form trust 
and is unlikely to yield strong-form trust. Even worse, the single alliance may have 
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failed, possibly due to opportunistic behavior by the partner firm. In such cases, the prior 
partner is not a trusted Acquaintance but rather “the devil in disguise”, suggesting the 
old conundrum, “better the (inside) devil you know than the (outside) saint you don’t.” 
While in theory, Acquaintances and Friends should vary along a continuum related to 
the number of prior alliances (and therefore the level of implicit trust embedded in the 
relationship), for ease of analysis in the present study I focus only on the polar cases. 
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PRIOR PARTNERS 
As recognized by the previous literature reviewed in Chapter II, there are 
multiple benefits of selecting prior partners over Strangers for new alliances (Gulati, 
1995a). The trust/social capital between firms generated through their previous alliances 
supplies the mutual confidence that parties will not exploit each other’s vulnerabilities 
(Sabel, 1993). In R&D alliances, the predictability of their partners’ behaviors is 
important to firms. Due to the public goods nature of knowledge (Johnson, 1970; Arrow, 
1974; Contractor & Wonchan, 2002), it is impossible for each party to precisely define 
their core technologies. Also, a complete contract beforehand is impossible to write in 
R&D alliances where intense interaction and exchange of knowledge are required to 
achieve the goal of developing new technologies. Trust established during prior 
interactions convinces partner firms that their partners will make a good-faith effort not 
to take excessive and unilateral advantage of the other, even when the opportunity is 
available.  
So, why not select one firm with which to form all alliances? Obviously any one 
partner may not have all the complementary resources that the firm needs for different 
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purposes; but, more importantly, this is because there are also potential disadvantages 
associated with prior partners. First, repeated interactions with a limited number of 
partners may cause a firm to lose its flexibility in partner selection for new alliances. 
Although it is good for firms to build trust through multiple cooperative relationships, it 
may lock them in the established relationships (Gulati, 1995b). For instance, concerns 
about searching costs may prevent firms from looking beyond their own existing pool of 
social relationships (Ellis, 2000). Also, forming alliances with new partners may offend 
existing partners, particularly when the existing ones are able to provide similar (but 
perhaps not as good) technologies as the new partners.  
Second, path-dependent learning may prevent the collaboration between prior 
partners from achieving the goal of developing radical innovations.  Radical innovations 
are fundamental changes that represent a clear departure from existing practices through 
revolutionary changes in technology (Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 
1996; Hart & Christensen, 2002; Sheremata, 2004). Therefore, novelty is critical to 
develop radical innovations. However, partner firms that have had multiple interactions 
may have developed similar mental maps for innovation. It may be difficult for their 
collaboration to develop something divergent from the existing technologies. Hence, 
forming R&D alliances with prior partners that share similar learning patterns can slow 
expansion into novel technological domains in the long run.  
The concerns about losing novelty are consistent with Leonard-Barton’s (1992) 
arguments on core rigidities. Leonard-Barton considers a core capability as “the 
knowledge set that distinguishes and provides a competitive advantage” (p.113). Such a 
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knowledge set is composed of skills, technical systems and managerial systems, all of 
which are deeply rooted in values and norms of a firm. Core rigidities are the flip side of 
core capabilities. Skills, technical systems, managerial systems, and values served the 
firm well in the past can become an inappropriate set of knowledge causing problems for 
nondominant disciplines and/or future projects. Such core rigidities are particularly 
problematic in creating new, nontraditional capabilities.  
Third, while firms are more likely to expose their valuable knowledge to prior 
partners than Strangers, risks of appropriation still exist and are even higher under 
certain circumstances. Due to the information asymmetry between partner firms, 
appropriation by Strangers can be stopped or delayed by informal methods of intellectual 
property protection such as lead time and learning curves. Prior partners, through earlier 
interactions, understand each other’s know-how, operating routines, and managerial 
practices. If they choose to behave opportunistically, it is even easier for prior partners 
than for Strangers to appropriate the firm’s core technologies.  
As noted above, trust can be developed through repeated interactions between 
firms; trust eases partner firms’ concerns about potential knowledge leakage in their 
alliances. However, the pace of trust development is much slower than the pace of the 
reduction of information asymmetry between partners. That is, information asymmetry 
between partners can be reduced to a minimum degree through one alliance while it 
usually takes several collaborations to build up the trust between partner firms. 
Therefore, Acquaintances are featured by the low level of information asymmetry and 
the low level of trust. Partnering with Acquaintances creates a serious situation for firms 
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to worry about whether their Acquaintances may behave opportunistically, because it is 
very likely that Acquaintances will succeed in “stealing” their partners’ core 
technologies if they choose to do so. Therefore, appropriation concerns are more salient 
for Acquaintances than for Strangers and Friends. I also conclude that the distinction 
between an Acquaintance and a Friend represents a useful and relevant dichotomous 
measure of prior partners, with Friends being more trustworthy than Acquaintances.  
TECHNOLOGY PROTECTION AND PARTNER SELECTION 
This section examines how (1) different types of innovation that an R&D alliance 
intends to develop and (2) the intellectual property protection offered by the external 
market affect a firm’s partner selection decision to protect its valuable knowledge 
exposed in an R&D alliance.  How well technological assets can be protected is partly 
based on the degree of technological exposure in an R&D alliance. R&D projects can 
run the gamut from those involving development of new products or processes based on 
incremental modifications of existing technology, to radical, ambiguous projects where 
firms seek to develop the ‘next generation’ of a particular product. For R&D alliances 
seeking to develop different types of innovations (incremental vs. radical), the level of 
partner firms’ exposure of their valuable knowledge varies. It is intuitive to expect that 
more protection/prevention of opportunism is needed when there is extensive exposure 
of partner firms’ core technologies. In addition, the level of intellectual property 
protection granted by the external environment affects partner firms’ alliance formation 
decisions. Firms rely on formal protection of their proprietary assets such as patents and 
copyrights; however, various degrees of protection effectiveness in different markets 
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leave partner firms to govern the residual opportunism through making careful partner 
selection decisions when the alliance was initially formed.  
Incremental versus Radical Innovation  
There are at least two types of innovations that R&D alliances can develop – 
radical and incremental (Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Sheremata, 2004). In general, radical 
innovations are based on new design concepts that break paradigms; whereas 
incremental innovations are based on minor improvements or adjustments in the current 
technology.  
Radical innovations are fundamental changes that represent a clear departure 
from existing practices through revolutionary changes in technology. Thus, radical 
innovations are typically disruptive to the existing organizational capabilities 
(Christensen, 1997). Firms committed to disruptive innovations seek to locate 
entrepreneurial opportunities that can shift the basis of competition in the industry 
(Ireland, Hitt, & Sirmon, 2003). These firms try to proactively influence their 
competitive destiny rather than waiting to be influenced by the evolution of the markets 
in which they compete (Barney, 2002).  
In contrast, incremental innovations are sustaining of the status quo (Tushman & 
Rosenkopf, 1996; Hart & Christensen, 2002). Incremental innovations help incumbent 
firms derive maximum value from their current capabilities by providing customers with 
similar products or services at a lower cost and/or easier accessibility. That is, 
incremental innovations do not substantively change either production or consumption 
patterns. 
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I acknowledge that the distinction between incremental and radical innovation is 
not clearcut (Hage, 1980; Sheremata, 2004). However, because the middle values are 
difficult to interpret and are not the emphasis of this study, I focus only on the two 
extremes. Moreover, although innovation has many dimensions (Downs Jr. & Mohr, 
1976; Tornatzky & Klein, 1982; Ahuja & Lampert, 2001), radicality is of particular 
interest in this study because it affects the extent to which partner firms expose their 
technological assets to each other. 
R&D alliances intending to develop incremental innovations raise fewer risks of 
technology leakage than those aiming at radical innovations, for at least two reasons. 
First, the preexistence of a product or process technology enables parties to delineate 
property rights at the outset with far less ambiguity than when the relevant technology 
does not exist (Pisano, 1989). Because incremental innovations are usually based on pre-
existing knowledge, it is possible for partner firms to specify what technologies will be 
exposed and what will not. In contrast, it is almost impossible to specify beforehand 
what knowledge will be involved when the objective of an R&D project is to develop 
something breaking the current paradigm (radical innovation). It is difficult for both 
parties to be aware of what should be written into the contract.  Thus, cooperation with 
the intent of developing incremental innovations poses fewer risks of technology leakage 
than that targeting at radical innovations. As such, steps to control partners’ 
opportunistic behavior are less necessary for alliances focusing on incremental 
innovations than those on radical ones.  
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Second, radical innovations usually require new, subtle insights into customer 
needs and extensive coordination between alliance partners.  Radical designs frequently 
take advantage of new process technology, and this also requires coordination with a 
company’s advanced process technology development efforts. Incremental product 
developments, on the other hand, require relatively little direct coordination with 
customers and engineers of process technology or manufacturing. Customer 
requirements tend to be well understood and codified, and the innovation stays within 
the established specifications of the existing process technology.  
Although the previous literature has claimed that forming alliances between prior 
partners may reduce the potential for opportunism (Sabel, 1993; Gulati, 1995a), the 
extent to which this is accurate depends upon the circumstances. I agree that it is 
necessary to form alliances with trustworthy partners when the R&D project is aiming at 
the development of radical innovations. This is the case for firms that are Friends to each 
other. However, this situation is different for firms that are only Acquaintances.  
Acquaintances know each other through one previous alliance, but no strong-form trust 
has been established. Sometimes, even worse, Acquaintances recognize each other as 
“the devil they know” if one or both partners behaved opportunistically in the earlier 
cooperation. Obviously, firms will not select the known devil for R&D alliances 
involving extensive interactions. Even if there is no negative experience between the 
possible partners, Acquaintances may avoid collaborating with each other for an R&D 
alliance involving radical innovations. This is because of the concern of over-exposure 
of their core technologies. In contrast to Strangers, Acquaintances are more familiar with 
 
 48
their partner firms’ technological assets, and thus, are able to appropriate their valuable 
knowledge more easily. Under such circumstances, firms may intentionally avoid 
Acquaintances to protect themselves from over-exposing their technological assets and 
other operation-related assets. Only after additional rounds of interaction, Acquaintances 
may build trust between each other and start to engage in alliances involving valuable 
technologies.   
Hypothesis 1a. The more radical the innovation goals of the R&D alliance, 
the more likely the alliance partners are to be Friends rather than Strangers. 
Hypothesis 1b. The more radical the innovation goals of the R&D alliance, 
the less likely the alliance partners are to be Acquaintances rather than 
Strangers. 
In short, to protect technological assets, the selection of a partner depends on the 
innovation characteristics that affect the firm’s concerns about knowledge leakage. 
However, it also depends on the protection that the external environment can provide to 
alliance partners. 
Intellectual Property Protection 
Partner firms in an R&D alliance also rely on formal protection of their 
proprietary assets, such as patents and copyrights. However, various situations make the 
formal protection ineffective, or not as effective as expected, leaving firms to govern the 
residual opportunism through careful selection of partners.  First, firms seeking 
protection for technology transferred across national borders face a complicated variety 
of legal rules and procedures (Oxley, 1999). Many countries are signatories to the Paris 
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Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, which requires that foreign 
nationals are granted the same intellectual property protection as domestic citizens. 
However, the convention does not specify what standards of protection should be in 
place, and consequently the actual level of intellectual property protection varies 
significantly across countries. For instance, the effective duration of patent protection 
ranges from 5 years in several Latin American countries to close to 20 years in most 
European countries (Oxley, 1999). 
Furthermore, governments in most developing countries know that every country 
that has enhanced its economy has done so by imitating.  This may lead to policymakers 
intentionally relaxing their intellectual property protection. Under such a weak formal 
protection, firms must rely on trust to expect that their partners will not appropriate their 
valuable knowledge during the cooperation. If such partners with high level trust cannot 
be found, firms must either find alternative means to reduce the hazards of cooperation, 
such as equity-based governance, or forgo the benefits of collaborative R&D. 
Second, fundamental shifts in technology are rapidly making the current system 
of intellectual property protection ineffective.  “It is clear that the invention of a new 
gene cannot be handled in the same way as the invention of a new gearbox” (Thurow, 
1997: 98).  The current worldwide convention on intellectual property protection was 
designed more than 100 years ago to meet the simpler needs of a far less developed 
industrial era. Such a convention is based on an undifferentiated, “one-size-fits-all” 
system. Treating all advances in knowledge in the same way may have worked when 
most patents were granted for new mechanical devices, but current knowledge-intensive 
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industries pose challenges that are far more complex. The changes in technology nature 
shift the duty (also the costs) of protecting advanced knowledge from the market to 
partner firms.  Firms, particularly those in high-technology industries, depend on social 
mechanisms, rather than economic mechanisms, to protect their core knowledge from 
being appropriated in R&D alliances. Thus, whether a partner is trustworthy becomes 
extremely important for firms with concerns about intellectual property protection. Firms 
form R&D alliances with prior partners rather than Strangers, expecting that their 
partners will cooperate in good faith.  
Third, different cultures and different parts of the world perceive intellectual 
property rights quite differently.  Respect for individual property rights is deeply rooted 
in the individualism of many Western cultures and nations (Hofstede, 1994). However, 
collective and group-oriented Eastern cultures are at odds with such a belief (Zeller, 
1999). For instance, the idea that people should be paid to be creative stems from the 
Judeo-Christian and Muslim belief in a God who created humankind in His image. 
However, there is no counterpart in Hindu, Buddhist or Confucian societies.  This adds 
to the perceived risks, for firms operating in foreign countries, of exposing their valuable 
technological assets locally. In this situation, firms choose partners with whom they have 
similar philosophy and respect towards intellectual property protection. Such 
understanding and confidence in partners can only be achieved through repeated 
interactions. Generally, firms that are Friends are more able to do so than firms that are 
Acquaintance or Strangers.  
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Hypothesis 2a. The weaker the intellectual property rights protection, the 
more likely the alliance partners are to be Friends rather than Strangers. 
Hypothesis 2b. The weaker the intellectual property rights protection, the 
more likely the alliance partners are to be Acquaintances than Strangers. 
Furthermore, the characteristics of innovations to be developed in an R&D 
alliance and the formal protection of intellectual protection in the market jointly affect 
firms’ selection of cooperative partners. I have argued above that the radicality of the 
innovation is positively related to the formation of an R&D alliance between Friends but 
negatively related to the alliance formation between Acquaintances. In a market with 
weak intellectual property protection, the concerns of knowledge leakage are even 
stronger than in a market with strong protection. Therefore, firms are less likely to rely 
on their social considerations to structure the R&D cooperation in a strong-protection 
environment than in a weak-protection environment. That is, the positive relationship 
between the innovation radicality and the formation of R&D alliances between Friends 
is not as strong in a strong-protection environment as in a weak-protection environment. 
Similarly, the negative relationship between the innovation radicality and the formation 
of R&D alliance between Acquaintances is not as strong in a strong-protection 
environment as in a weak-protection one. 
Hypothesis 3a. Intellectual property rights protection weakens the positive 
relationship between the radicality of innovation goals of the R&D alliance 
and the likelihood of alliance formation between Friends rather than 
Strangers. 
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Hypothesis 3b. Intellectual property rights protection weakens the negative 
relationship between the radicality of innovation goals of the R&D alliance 
and the likelihood of alliance formation between Acquaintances rather than 
Strangers. 
Dynamic Aspects of Alliance Formation  
As I argued earlier, the three questions in R&D alliance formation – whom 
(partner selection), how (governance structure), and what (alliance scope) – are 
interrelated and each choice made is likely to affect the other two decisions. In this 
section, I examine the set of decisions as a dynamic and endogenous system.  
Cooperation often has a social dimension as well as an economic dimension 
(Blau, 1964). Transaction cost theorists treat transactions as independent from each 
other. For instance, Williamson (1975) claims that “legal ordering” incentives, such as 
shared ownership of specific investments, can be used to restrain opportunism to 
safeguard future profits yielded by cooperation (Axelrod, 1984; Heide & Miner, 1992). 
Hennart (1982; 1991) and Teece (1986) suggest that equity joint ventures offer “mutual 
hostage” positions that can guarantee performance as part of the internationalization 
process to avoid opportunistic behavior. However, according to Murakami and Rohlen, 
“[T]he value of the relationship itself is typically ignored and the impersonality of the 
transaction is assumed” (1992: 70). To govern a cooperative relationship, both economic 
and social mechanisms matter.  
Different from hierarchical arrangements such as shared-ownership, trust has 
been viewed as the glue that keeps business partners together (Barber, 1983; Palay, 
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1984; Killing, 1988; Lorenz, 1988). Buckley and Casson (1988) address the same issue 
by concluding that equity joint ventures are only needed when other means of 
guaranteeing forbearance from cheating on contracts, such as trust, are weak. Similarly, 
Gulati (1995a) also argues that firms with prior interactions are likely to rely on trust, 
rather than an expensive equity-based structure, to govern their cooperative relationship. 
Hence, weak protection of intellectual property in the market or high level of exposure 
of core technology (required by the goal of the alliance such as developing next-
generation technology) tends to push the partners to select either equity-based 
governance for their cooperation or prior partners to eliminate or reduce opportunism.  
Hypothesis 4a. When the R&D alliance is structured as an equity joint 
venture, the likelihood is lower that the alliance partners are prior partners. 
Hypothesis 4b. When the R&D alliance is between prior partners, the 
likelihood is lower that the alliance governance structure is an equity joint 
venture.  
When firms consider establishing an R&D alliance they need to decide on the 
scope of the alliance. An R&D alliance can exclusively focus on pure R&D activities. 
An increase in the vertical scope of the alliance leads to the combination of R&D with 
other activities, such as manufacturing and/or marketing. When the vertical scope of an 
R&D alliance is increased to encompass other activities, the extent of knowledge sharing 
and coordination inevitably rises (Reuer et al., 2002). To jointly bring an R&D project 
through to manufacturing and commercialization requires many more points of contact 
between the partner firms, with a concomitant reduction in control over information 
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flows across the relevant organizational boundaries (Teece, 1992). Moreover, 
operational routines exhibit substantial inseparability, and it is likely that knowledge 
gained in the course of manufacturing and marketing efforts within the alliance will have 
important effects on other areas of partner firms’ operations. As a result, it is almost 
impossible to effectively manage mixed activity R&D alliances without extensive 
sharing of tacit knowledge embedded in operational routines, which in turn may have 
significant effects on the relative competitive position of partner firms. 
Because an enlarged alliance scope requires a greater degree of partner firms’ 
core technologies exposed to each other, protection of technological assets becomes 
more challenging with increases in alliance scope. Firms are reluctant to accept such a 
high level of exposure of their valuable technologies without the strong-form trust 
toward their partners. Therefore, as the alliance scope expands, firms are more likely to 
pursue their prior partners, with which trust has been established, to form R&D 
alliances. Additionally, when firms are confident that their “old buddies” will not take 
unilateral advantage of them, it is tempting to extend their collaboration to other 
activities to achieve a higher level of synergy. 
Hypothesis 5a. When the alliance scope is broad, the likelihood is higher 
that the alliance partners are prior partners.  
Hypothesis 5b. When the R&D alliance is between prior partners, the 
likelihood is higher that the alliance scope is broad. 
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SUMMARY  
The present chapter first defines three types of partners that firms may choose 
from for new R&D alliances – Strangers, Acquaintances and Friends. The chapter then 
analyzes firms’ selection of prior partners as an alternative way to protect their core 
technological assets in R&D alliances. Specifically, hypotheses are proposed regarding 
how innovation radicality and intellectual property protection in the market influence 
firms’ partner selection choices for their new R&D alliances. Further, this chapter 
explores the nature of the relationship between partner selection, governance structure 
and alliance scope, and hypothesizes that partner selection, governance structure and 
alliance scope can be used as substituting mechanisms by firms to protect their valuable 
technological assets from being appropriated in R&D alliances. 
While the above arguments are about general R&D alliances, the following two 
chapters investigate partner selection in international and multilateral R&D alliances. 
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CHAPTER IV 
KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION AND PARTNER SELECTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL R&D ALLIANCES 
This chapter first examines how domestic and international R&D alliances differ 
when partner selection is used as a mechanism to protect participating firms’ 
technological assets. Due to the lack of trust resulting from different national 
backgrounds, alliance partners have more concerns about knowledge leakage for their 
international than domestic R&D alliances. This affects their decisions about partner 
selection. The chapter then examines three types of international R&D alliances 
categorized by partner nationality to see how partner selection varies across these three 
types of international R&D alliances.  
DOMESTIC VERSUS INTERNATIONAL R&D ALLIANCES 
While there are many reasons for firms to move their R&D activities abroad (as 
reviewed in Chapter II), international R&D alliances are risky. Hymer (1960; 1976) first 
observed that foreign entrants incur unfamiliarity costs due to differences in home and 
host countries’ economic, social, legal, and political and cultural systems. Transferring 
his observation to international strategic alliances, we can conclude that partner firms 
with different nationality backgrounds encounter more challenges of communication and 
coordination in their collaboration than their counterparts in domestic strategic alliances.  
One of the most salient differences stems from national cultures. National culture 
refers to deeply set values that are common to the members of a nation (Hofstede, 1991; 
Hill, 1997). It is a system of shared norms, values, and priorities that, taken together, 
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constitute a “design of living” for a person. National culture provides meaning to “how 
things ought to be” and “how things ought to be done” for individuals in a country 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Terpstra & David, 1991). The influence of national culture 
is strong and long lasting. For example, Hofstede (1991) found that national culture 
explains 50 percent of the differences in managers’ attitudes, beliefs, and values. Laurent 
(1983) found that managers of multinational organizations retain many of their original 
national values despite routinely working in culturally diverse situations.  
Therefore, for partners from different countries, there is a lack of shared norms 
and values (Park & Ungson, 1997). The influence of a society’s culture permeates all 
aspects of life within the society, including the values, practices and systems of 
managers. The cross-cultural interactions found in international alliances bring together 
people who may have different patterns of behaving and believing and different 
cognitive blueprints for interpreting the world (Maruyama, 1984; Black & Mendenhall, 
1990; Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997). The lack of common understanding may 
undermine the partners’ interpretation of each other’s strategic intent (Hitt et al., 1995) 
and reduce effective communication (Rao & Schmidt, 1998) and trust (Aulakh, Kotabe, 
& Sahay, 1996; Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998). Therefore, international alliances 
have greater obstacles for building trust and a concomitant higher potential for 
appropriation concerns than domestic alliances because the difficulties of specifying 
intellectual property rights, legally enforcing intellectual property, and monitoring 
partner activities are greater among cross-border firms (Pisano, 1990; Oxley, 1997). 
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Due to the lack of shared norms, partners’ behaviors are less predictable in an 
international than a domestic R&D alliance. International R&D alliance partners have 
more concerns about knowledge leakage for their cross-border R&D collaboration than 
domestic R&D alliance partners.  However, at the same time, a complete contract is even 
more impossible to write beforehand because of more uncertainties involved in 
international than domestic operations. Under such situations (i.e., more concern on 
knowledge leakage plus greater environmental complexity), international R&D alliance 
partners have a higher need for social mechanisms, such as trust between them, to assure 
the protection of their own valuable technological assets from being appropriated during 
the collaboration. Trust built up during prior interactions is valuable in this case and can 
be used to convince partner firms that their partners will make a good-faith effort not to 
take unilateral advantage of each other by appropriating its valuable technological assets. 
Therefore, it is more likely for partner firms to be prior partners in an international than a 
domestic R&D alliance. 
Hypothesis 6. The likelihood of alliance formation between prior partners is 
greater in an international than a domestic R&D alliance.  
NON-CONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONAL R&D ALLIANCE FROM 
NATIONALITY PERSPECTIVE 
The international alliance literature has largely focused on two parent alliances 
formed between one foreign and one local firm. However, other types of alliances exist. 
I differentiate three distinct forms of international alliances based on the alliance 
partners’ nationalities. Partner nationality involves the country-of-origin of the parent 
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firm. Following Makino and Beamish (1998), I define the nationality of the firm in terms 
of the country-of-origin, not the location, of the firm. I used this definition because 
home-country effects of foreign firms tend to persist for long periods of time due to the 
fact that the founding conditions and the basis of competitive advantages of the parent 
firms strongly reflect home-country conditions (Porter, 1990). Also, many studies have 
defined the nationality of a foreign parent in terms of the national origin of the firm, not 
in terms of its location (e.g., Kogut & Singh, 1988; Erramilli, 1996). Figure 2.3 in 
Chapter 2 illustrates the three types of international R&D alliances – cross-national 
domestic R&D alliance (DRDA) formed by two foreign firms from the same home 
country in the local market, traditional international R&D alliance (IRDA) formed by a 
foreign and a local firm, and trinational international R&D alliance (TRDA) formed by 
two foreign firms from different home countries in the local market.  
I examine the differences among these three international R&D alliances from 
the perspective of cultural differences. Culture refers to patterns of beliefs and values 
that are manifested in practices, behaviors, and various artifacts shared by members of 
an organization or a nation (Hofstede, 1980; Trice & Beyer, 1993).  Whereas 
organizations from different nations differ in fundamental values, organizations from the 
same nation differ mainly in organizational practices (Hofstede et al., 1990). Therefore, 
the following discussion is based on organizational differences in terms of both national 
culture and organizational culture.
As argued above, national culture is a systems of shared norms, values, and 
priorities, which together provides meaning to “how things ought to be” and “how things 
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ought to be done” for individuals in a country (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Hofstede, 
1991; Terpstra & David, 1991; Hill, 1997). Company executives retain much of their 
original national values even when working in a different national culture (Laurent, 
1983). National cultural differences differentiate partners based on their values and 
norms, which further reduces the effectiveness of communication and cooperation 
between partners. 
Organizational culture is “a pattern of basic assumptions – invented, discovered, 
or developed by” an organization as “it learns to cope with its problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration – that has worked well enough to be considered valid 
and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and 
feel in relation to those problems” (Schein, 1985: 9). Organizational culture is the social 
or normative glue that holds an organization together (Sorge & Maurice, 1990). 
Organizational culture forms a type of social control that identifies and reinforces 
appropriate behaviors and attitudes for organization members to display (O'Reilly & 
Chatman, 1996). Organizational cultures differentiate alliance partners based on their 
management practices. Differences in practices represent conflicting expectations and 
incompatible organizational processes. Partners with dissimilar organizational cultures 
may expand time and energy to establish managerial practices and routines to facilitate 
interaction, and may incur higher costs and more mistrust than cultural similar partners 
(Sirmon & Lane, 2004). 
Managers from the same national background differentiate their work practices 
as a result of the influence of heterogeneous organizational cultures (Hofstede et al., 
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1990). However, organizational culture does not completely supersede or displace the 
influence of one’s national culture (Hofstede et al., 1990). As a matter of fact, firm 
specific organizational cultural differences are often interwoven with the fabric of the 
partners’ national cultural differences as reflected in the phrases: European family 
capitalism, American managerial capitalism, and Japanese group capitalism (Parkhe, 
2003).  
Firms operating internationally face obstacles stemming from national cultural 
differences, organizational cultural differences, and/or the combination of these two 
(Pothukuchi et al., 2002; Sirmon & Lane, 2004). For instance, Barkema and colleagues 
found that the termination of joint ventures was more susceptible to cultural distance 
than wholly-owned subsidiaries because the former had to accommodate both national 
and organizational cultural differences, or “double-layered acculturation” (Barkema, 
Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997) while the latter faced only 
national cultural differences. Parkhe (1991) also suggests that the combination of diverse 
national contexts and organizational culture of alliance partners may further hamper 
effective inter-partner collaborations and negatively affect the longevity of alliances. 
Though all international R&D alliances face cultural barriers, the barriers are not 
the same for different types of international R&D alliances. Partner firms of a DRDA are 
from the same home country; therefore, cultural barriers only stem from organizational 
cultural differences between partners. Partner firms of an IRDA are from two different 
countries; therefore cultural barriers stem from both national and organizational cultural 
differences. Similarly, partner firms of a TRDA are also from two different countries and 
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cultural barriers arise from both national and organizational cultural differences. 
However, in comparison with IRDA, partner firms of TRDA have to encounter more 
complexity because both partner firms are foreign. One of IRDA partner firms is local 
and helps to diminish its foreign partner’s liability of foreignness (i.e., costs of doing 
business abroad that result in a competitive disadvantage for an MNE subunit (Zaheer, 
1995)). In contrast, both partner firms of a TRDA are foreign to the local market; 
therefore, partners of TRDA encounter more complexities than partner firms of an 
IRDA. Therefore, the complexity degree of the three types of international R&D 
alliances can be ranked as TRDA > IRDA > DRDA.  
Both national and organizational cultural differences present diverging practices 
that lead to conflicting expectations and incompatible organizational processes. Partners 
with dissimilar cultures have to consume more time and energy to establish managerial 
practices and routines to facilitate interaction, than do culturally similar partners. 
Further, the more complex the cultural differences, the more potential conflicts may 
arise between alliance partners and the more concerns firms will have regarding 
partners’ potential appropriation of their valuable technological assets in their R&D 
alliances.  Trust established during previous interactions is more likely to be relied on to 
convince a firm that its partners will make a good-faith effort not to take unilateral 
advantage by appropriating its valuable technological assets. Therefore, the likelihood of 
R&D alliance formation between prior partners can be ranked in the sequence of TRDA 
> IRDA > DRDA. 
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Hypothesis 7. The likelihood of selecting prior partners for international 
R&D alliances decreases in the sequence of TRDA > IRDA > DRDA.  
SUMMARY  
The present chapter first analyzes the complexity involved in international R&D 
alliance and proposes that alliance formation between prior partners is more likely for 
international than domestic R&D alliances. This is because the lack of trust resulting 
from different national backgrounds causes alliance partners to have more concerns 
about knowledge leakage for their international R&D alliances than domestic ones. The 
chapter then differentiates three types of international R&D alliances from a nationality 
perspective and examines them by looking at national and organizational cultural 
differences between partners jointly. I propose that alliance formation between prior 
partners is most likely in trinational R&D alliances (TRDAs) and least likely in cross-
national domestic R&D alliances (DRDAs).  
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CHAPTER V 
KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION AND PARTNER SELECTION IN 
MULTILATERAL R&D ALLIANCES  
This chapter investigates multilateral R&D alliances.  Alliances can be between 
two or more partners. When the number of partners increases, the management of R&D 
collaboration becomes more complicated. From a social exchange perspective, this 
chapter analyzes how partner selection can be used differently in multilateral than 
bilateral R&D alliances, for the purpose of knowledge protection. As defined in Chapter 
II (Literature Review), a multilateral R&D alliance refers to an R&D alliance formed 
between more than two firms. 
SOCIAL EXCHANGE COMPLEXITY IN MULTILATERAL R&D ALLIANCES 
A multilateral R&D alliance3 is a single, large, overarching R&D alliance joined 
by at least three companies for a common purpose. Such alliances have gradually 
emerged in many industries. Usually, multilateral R&D alliances are formed to cope 
with the tremendous resource requirements and/or risks involved in large-scale R&D 
projects. While multilateral alliances have the same value creation logic as bilateral 
R&D alliances, the involvement of more than two participants complicates alliance 
design and governance (Doz & Hamel, 1998).  
In multi-firm settings such as multilateral R&D alliances, relationships among 
firms can no longer be examined in a segregated, dyadic manner. As discussed in 
Chapter II, multilateral alliances, with at least three partner firms, are based on 
                                                 
3 The comparison between bilateral alliance, multilateral alliance and alliance network can be found in 
Chapter II and visually illustrated in Figure 2.4. 
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generalized exchanges. Different from restricted social exchange occurring when two 
parties directly exchange favors with each other, generalized social exchanges take place 
among a group of at least three parties, and there is no direct reciprocity among them 
(Takahashi, 2000). Research on group behavior suggests that beyond a certain threshold, 
an increase in the number of participants in any group can lead to dysfunctional behavior 
within the group and to a decline in its ability to perform assigned tasks (Steiner, 1972; 
Hackman, 1987). Multilateral alliances pose larger organizational problems than 
bilateral alliances.  “[M]anaging multi-firm alliances presents important challenges to 
managers” (Hwang & Burgers, 1997: 101). 
Within multilateral R&D alliances, the presence of more than two partners 
heightens the possibility of opportunism and conflict. Although both restricted and 
general social exchanges are subject to significant risks of opportunistic behaviors, 
accountability is relatively high and opportunistic activities are relatively easy to detect 
and remedy in restricted exchanges. By comparison, risks are more prevalent in 
generalized exchanges (Takahashi, 2000). Given the ambiguity and disjointed nature of 
exchanges, participating firms in multilateral R&D alliances have more incentives for 
opportunistic behaviors such as appropriating other partner firms’ valuable technological 
assets, than participating firms in bilateral R&D alliances. Therefore, trust is more 
valuable in multilateral than bilateral R&D alliances to govern partners’ activities. 
However, trust is more difficult to establish among multilateral R&D alliance 
partners, in contrast to partners of bilateral R&D alliances. Parkhe (1993) notes that 
increasing the number of partners in an alliance can limit the level of trust between 
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alliance partners. This is because the increasing number of partners in an alliance can 
make identifying and realizing common interests more difficult, which complicates the 
task of ensuring trust between alliance partners. Moreover, having more partners makes 
it less likely that all the partners will trust one another in the alliance. Monitoring each 
partner’s contributions and introducing appropriate sanctions in the face of opportunistic 
behaviors is harder to implement when there is a large group of participants involved.  
KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION IN MULTILATERAL R&D ALLIANCES 
Multilateral R&D alliances are based on generalized exchanges and, thus, share 
at least two salient features of such exchanges. First, partner firms of multilateral R&D 
alliances face higher risks of opportunism. Exchanges in multilateral alliances are 
carried out by multiple parties that do not reciprocate with each other directly; 
monitoring each other’s behaviors is difficult. Therefore, partner firms of multilateral 
alliances have more concerns about whether their partners will behave opportunistically 
and take unilateral advantage of them. Protecting their valuable technological assets is a 
major consideration that concerns multilateral R&D alliance participants. Second, 
partner firms of multilateral R&D alliances have a higher need for trust, because of the 
considerable risks of opportunism involved. Trust among alliance partners reduces 
anxiety and allows reciprocity to take place over time. Therefore, when selecting 
partners for multilateral R&D alliances, in contrast to bilateral ones, firms are more 
likely to focus on their prior partners they can trust.  
Hypothesis 8. The likelihood of alliance between prior partners is higher in 
a multilateral than a bilateral R&D alliance.  
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I argued in Chapter III that the more radical innovation an R&D alliance intends 
to develop, the more cautious the alliance partners are regarding knowledge leakage. 
Such concerns are sharper when the number of R&D alliance participants increases. In 
multilateral R&D alliances, in contrast to bilateral ones, partners have more concerns 
about knowledge leakage and therefore have a greater need for trust among each other to 
address such concerns. When the innovation that an R&D alliance intends to develop is 
radical and requires a higher level of disclosure of partner firms’ core technological 
assets, worries about partners’ opportunistic behaviors are greater. Therefore, the causal 
relationships between innovation radicality and partner selection in R&D alliances are 
strengthened in a multilateral R&D alliance, in contrast to a bilateral one.  
Hypothesis 9a. The positive relationship between the radicality of 
innovations to be developed and the likelihood of alliance formation between 
Friends is stronger in a multilateral than a bilateral R&D alliance. 
Hypothesis 9b. The negative relationship between the radicality of 
innovations to be developed and the likelihood of alliance formation between 
Acquaintances is stronger in a multilateral than a bilateral R&D alliance. 
I also argued in Chapter III that formal protection of intellectual property affects 
firms’ selection of R&D alliance partners. Such effects are stronger when the R&D 
alliance is multilateral than bilateral. In multilateral R&D alliances, the enlarged concern 
on other partners’ appropriation of their technological assets causes partner firms to be 
more sensitive to the change of their protective environments. When the intellectual 
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property protection decreases, the need to rely on prior partners which they can trust is 
higher in multilateral R&D alliances, in contrast to bilateral ones.  
Hypothesis 10. The negative relationship between the intellectual property 
protection offered by the local market and the likelihood of alliance 
formation between prior partners is stronger in a multilateral than a 
bilateral R&D alliance. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter emphasizes multilateral R&D alliances. When the number of 
partners increases, the management of R&D collaboration is complicated. From a social 
exchange perspective, this chapter argues that multilateral R&D alliance is featured by 
partners’ concerns about higher risks of others’ opportunism and more reliance on trust 
to govern their collaborations. I propose that alliance formation between prior partners is 
more likely in multilateral R&D alliances, and that the causal relationships proposed in 
Chapter III are strengthened in multilateral R&D alliances, in contrast to bilateral ones.  
The next chapter describes the research design used to empirically test the 
theoretical hypotheses proposed in Chapters III, IV and V.
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CHAPTER VI 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes a research design that is used to test the hypotheses 
proposed in Chapters III, IV, and V.  Below, I present the sample selection, 
measurements of variables, and statistical analysis techniques. 
SAMPLE SELECTION 
The overall sample is composed of 2185 R&D alliances (i.e., alliances involving 
collaborative R&D activities exclusively and in combination with manufacturing and/or 
marketing activities) involving firms in high-technology industries, from 1994 to 2003. 
Firms in these industries are ideal for a study of R&D collaboration. Survival and 
profitability in these high-technology industries are critically dependent on firms’ 
abilities to create and commercialize innovations quickly. Therefore, they establish R&D 
alliances at an unprecedented rate as a way to spread the risk and cost of technological 
development.  
The list of these high-technology industries is published at the AeA website 
(http://www.aeanet.org/Publications/IDMK_definition.asp). AeA, founded in 1943, is 
the largest association of high-tech companies in the United States, representing all 
segments of the technology industry. AeA's definition of high-tech industry consists of 
SIC codes that fall into two broad categories – high-tech manufacturing (SIC codes: 357, 
365, 366, 367, 381, 382, 384, and 386) and high-tech services which include 
communications services (SIC codes: 481, 482, 484, and 489), and software and 
computer-related services (SIC code: 737). The list does not include broad categories if 
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the high-tech portion does not represent a clear majority. SIC codes and industry names 
of all industries included in this study can be found in Appendix A.  
These sample R&D alliances are re-combined to create three categories to test 
the hypotheses proposed in Chapters III, IV and V, respectively. Figure 5.1 indicates the 
three research designs, based on Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002). Hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter III are tested in the setting of domestic bilateral R&D alliances, the 
most traditional definition of R&D alliances in the strategic management literature. The 
sample size is 1159. Hypotheses proposed in Chapter IV are tested using a sample 
including both domestic and international bilateral R&D alliances. The sample size is 
1921, among which 1159 are domestic and 762 are international. Hypotheses proposed 
in Chapter V are tested by a sample composed of domestic bilateral and multilateral 
R&D alliances. The sample size is 1423, of which 1159 are bilateral and 264 are 
multilateral. Because of the complications raised by international multilateral R&D 
alliances (see “Discussion” for future research avenues in this respect), the fourth cell is 
excluded in the present study. 
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FIGURE 5.1.  
Empirical Settings  
 
 Domestic International   Domestic International 
Bilateral ? ?  Bilateral ?  
Multilateral  ? Future research  Multilateral   
 
(a) Overall empirical setting 
  
(b) Empirical setting for hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter III 
 
 
 Domestic International   Domestic International 
Bilateral ? ?  Bilateral ?  
Multilateral     Multilateral ?  
 
(c) Empirical setting for hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter IV 
  
(d) Empirical setting for hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter V 
 
     Note: Shadowed cells are included.   
 
 
I collected the information on alliances from the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) Database on Alliances and Joint Ventures. The SDC database contains 
information on all types of alliances, compiled from publicly available sources such as 
SEC filings and their international counterparts, trade publications, wires, and news 
sources. Although the coverage of alliances is still far from comprehensive, this database 
currently represents one of the most comprehensive sources of information on alliances.  
MEASURES  
I list below the measures of dependent, independent, and control variables 
according to their sequence of appearance in the dissertation.  
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Dependent Variables 
Partner selection 
The first dependent variable is PARTNER, a categorical variable created from 
information in the SDC database to capture the relationship between alliance partners. 
PARTNER is set to 1 when the alliance partners are Strangers (i.e., partner firms have 
had no alliance during the past five years), 2 when the alliance partners are 
Acquaintances (i.e., partner firms have had one alliance during the past five years), and 3 
when the alliances partners are Friends (i.e., partner firms have had two or more 
alliances during the past five years). A five-year period is used because recent research 
suggests that the lifespan for alliances is usually no more than five years (Kogut, 1988, 
1989; Gulati, 1995b). 
I also create two dummy variables for the analysis of the dynamic aspects of 
alliance formation decisions. The first dummy variable, PRIOR, takes on the value of 1 
when an R&D alliance is formed between Acquaintances or Friends and 0 when an 
alliance is between Strangers.  The second dummy variable, FRIEND, equals to 1 when 
an R&D alliance is formed between Friends and 0 otherwise.  
Governance structure 
A dummy varies is generated to capture alliance governance mode. EQUITY is 
set to 1 when the R&D alliance is organized by equity-based joint venture; 0 when it is 
organized by non-equity-based contract. Information on governance is collected from the 
SDC database.  
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Alliance scope 
I create a dummy variable SCOPE to capture the vertical scope of alliance 
activities. SCOPE is set to 1 when alliance activities include manufacturing and/or 
marketing in addition to collaborative R&D. Such alliances are broader in scope than 
alliances involving R&D activities exclusively, for which SCOPE equals to 0. 
Information to create this variable is collected from the SDC database.  
Independent Variables 
Innovation radicality  
RADICALITY, the measure of innovation radicality, is coded from synopses of 
alliance activities provided by the SDC database, with a scale from 1 (very incremental) 
to 7 (very radical). The synopses of alliance activities were coded by two independent 
coders. The percent agreement is 73% and Cohen’s kappa4 is 0.79, which is well above 
the satisfactory level of 0.70. Disagreements are discussed and resolved by the two 
raters; the resolved scores were used in the analysis below.   
I also employ a dummy variable, RADICALITY2, to measure innovation 
radicality. The variable takes on the value of one when the innovative goal of an R&D 
alliance is to develop radical innovations. An innovation is categorized as radical when 
the alliance synopsis suggests that the primary activity is to pursue next generation 
technologies. This would include, for example, the alliance between Hitachi and Asahi 
Optical to develop a next-generation optical head that increases DVD storage capacity to 
                                                 
4 Cohen’s kappa is used to assess inter-rater reliability and is considered to be an improvement over using 
% agreement to evaluate this type of reliability. Kappa has a range from 0 ~ 1.00, with larger values 
indicating better reliability. 
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100GB. The omitted category of alliances involves incremental innovation when the 
synopsis suggests that alliance activities are focused on development of new products or 
processes based on existing technologies. An example would be the R&D alliance 
between Texas Instruments and Sharp to provide research and development services for 
camera-equipped cellular phones. Sharp agreed to supply camera lenses while Texas 
Instrument to make the semiconductor; both activities are based on the firms’ existing 
technologies. Similar results were observed using RADICALITY and RADICALITY2. 
Intellectual property protection 
PROTECTION is a continuous variable ranging from 1.34 to 9.51 for the 
markets where the sample alliances are located. This variable is centered in order to 
reduce multicollinearity problems appearing in regression models with interaction terms 
with independent variables.  
Information on intellectual property protection in the local market is taken from 
the World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) published by the International Institute for 
Management Development (IMD). The WCY, which has been published since 1989, is 
the world’s most comprehensive annual study on the competitiveness of nations.  IMD 
conducts executive surveys annually to quantify issues that are not easily measured such 
as intellectual property protection. The survey responses reflect perceptions of business 
executives who are dealing with international business markets. The executives are 
asked to evaluate the conditions of the country in which they work and have resided 
during the past year, drawing from the wealth of their international experience.  By so 
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doing, the WCY ensures that the evaluations portray an in-depth knowledge of their 
particular environment. 
International R&D alliance 
Difficulties in defining the nationality of a partner occur when a parent firm is 
wholly or partly a subsidiary of another parent firm, or a third firm with a different 
nationality. To simplify and clarify partner nationality, the following criteria from 
Makino and Beamish (1998) were adopted. First, when the partner is an independent 
firm, partner nationality is defined as the national origin of the parent firm. Second, 
when the partner is a subsidiary, partner nationality is defined as the national origin of 
the parent firm. Finally, when the partner is itself a joint venture, partner nationality is 
defined as the national origin of the firm that possesses the largest share of the equity. 
DRDA (cross-national domestic R&D alliance) is identified if both alliance 
partners of the R&D alliance are of the same nationality, but the nationality is different 
from the country where their alliance is located. IRDA (traditional international R&D 
alliance) is recognized if one alliance partner is local and one is foreign. TRDA 
(trinational R&D alliance) is identified if the partner firms are of different nationalities 
and neither of the nationalities is the country where their alliance is located.  These three 
types of R&D alliances compose international R&D alliances studied in this dissertation.  
Multilateral R&D alliances 
I create a dummy variable, MULTILATERAL, which takes on the value of 1 when 
the R&D alliance involves more than two firms and 0 if only two partner firms are 
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involved. All multilateral R&D alliances included are domestic, as specified above in 
Sample Selection section. 
Control Variables 
Industry 
I include a dummy variable, INDUSTRY, for the industry of the focal firm. The 
focal firm of an alliance is the partner that carries the major equity share (>50%), or is 
specified as the central organizer of the collaboration, or, if none of these two criteria 
can be applied, the first company whose name appear in the alliance’s name published in 
alliance announcement. Technologies used in some industries involve more uncertainty 
than others. For instance, system software generally has greater irreducible technological 
uncertainty than hardware design. Therefore, firms in different industries may have 
different levels of concerns with protecting their technological assets, which can adjust 
their decisions in selecting R&D alliance partners. In the analysis, I control for the focal 
firm’s industry by including a dummy variable, INDUSTRY. The focal firm is identified 
through the synopses text published by SDC. INDUSTRY is set to 1 if the primary SIC 
codes of alliance participants are 481, 482, 484, 489 and 737 (high-technology service 
industries, including both communication and computer-related services). INDUSTRY 
is set to 0 if the primary SIC codes of alliance participants are 357, 365, 366, 367, 381, 
382, 384, and 386 (high-technology manufacturing industries). 
Year  
Because the dataset covers R&D alliances over a ten year period, I must be 
concerned with the possibility that firms and industries have changing preferences 
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regarding partner selection. Thus, I also include nine dummy variables to control for the 
ten years in my analysis. 
In addition, EQUITY and SCOPE are included as control variables in regression 
models analyzing alliance partner selection. As discussed above, EQUITY is expected to 
be negatively associated with the likelihood of selecting a prior partner; SCOPE is 
expected to be positively associated with the likelihood of selecting a prior partner. 
STATISTICAL MODELS 
Several types of statistical models are used to test the hypotheses proposed. All 
statistical analyses are conducted using STATA/SE, version 8.0. 
Multinominal Logistic Regression 
Multinominal logistic regression is used to test Hypotheses 1a ~ 3b and 8 ~ 10a, 
because the dependent variable, PARTNER is categorical. The multinominal logistic 
regression estimates the effect of an explanatory variable on a partner category as the 
relative effect compared to the effect of the explanatory variable on one particular 
partner category (the baseline) (Long, 1997; Greene, 2000). In this study, I chose 
Stranger as the baseline because the hypotheses were proposed with Strangers as the 
comparison group. Coefficients for the independent variables are estimated for each of 
the two groups, Acquaintances and Friends. That is, for each multinominal logistic 
regression model, there are two sets of coefficients – one for Acquaintances, one for 
Friends.  
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Three-Stage Least Squares Analysis 
To test the hypotheses on the dynamic aspects of alliance formation decision 
(Hypotheses 4a ~ 5b), I allow for the interdependencies among the three decision 
variables. I do so by employing a three-stage least squares (3SLS) analysis. 3SLS 
estimates a system of structural equations, where some equations contain endogenous 
variables among the explanatory variables (STATA Manual, version 8.0). Typically, the 
endogenous explanatory variables are dependent variables from other equations in the 
system. The 3SLS estimation is an improvement on ordinary least square (OLS) 
estimation since the former corrects for the likelihood of omitted variable and 
simultaneity bias. The endogenous variables in this study are PRIOR/FRIENDS, 
EQUITY, and SCOPE. 
T-test Analysis 
One-tailed t-tests are used to test Hypotheses 6, 7 and 8. For Hypothesis 6, a one-
tailed t-test is utilized to compare the percentage of alliance formation between prior 
partners for domestic and international R&D alliances. For Hypothesis 7, three one-
tailed t-tests are operated to compare the percentage of alliance formation between prior 
partners for TRDA, IRDA, and DRDA (i.e., TRDA >  IRDA, TRDA > DRDA, and 
IRDA > DRDA). For Hypothesis 8, a one-tailed t-test is utilized to compare the 
percentage of alliance formation between prior partners for bilateral and multilateral 
R&D alliances. All comparisons are conducted twice with PRIOR and FRIENDS 
respectively.  
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SUMMARY  
In sum, this chapter describes the methods that are used to select the sample 
industry and firms, the measures that are employed to gauge the important variables, and 
an overview of the statistical models.  The empirical execution and the findings are 
provided in Chapter V.  Chapter VI provides a discussion of the results reported. 
Implications, limitations and avenues for additional research emerging from this 
dissertation are elaborated in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER VII 
RESULTS 
This chapter is divided into three sections presenting results of the hypotheses 
regarding partner selection as an alternative mechanism of knowledge protection in 
Chapter III, the hypotheses on partner selection for international R&D alliances in 
Chapter IV, and the hypotheses on partner selection for multilateral R&D alliances in 
Chapter V.  
PARTNER SELECTION AS A KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION MECHANISM 
Table 7.1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample of 1159 R&D alliances 
included in the empirical analysis. Several interesting features of my sample are worth 
mentioning here. With respect to the main dependent variable, the majority of the sample 
alliances (71 percent) are between Strangers while 29 percent are between 
Acquaintances (11 percent) or Friends (18 percent). Fifteen percent of the sample 
alliances are equity joint ventures, the remainder being contractual alliances. Also, 41 
percent of the sample alliances involve manufacturing and/or marketing in combination 
with R&D, while 59 percent involve R&D collaboration exclusively. Consistent with the 
literature, the correlation between scope and governance is positive and statistically 
significant at 0.06. Multicollinearity between variables was checked carefully and was 
not a problem. 
 
 
 TABLE 7.1.  
Descriptive Statistics (Domestic Bilateral R&D Alliances) 
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            Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1.               PARTNER 1.47 0.78 1 3 1.00
2.              
             
              
           
           
             
            
          
PRIOR 0.29 0.45 0 1 0.94* 1.00
3. FRIEND 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.92* 0.74* 1.00
4. EQUITY 0.15 0.36 0 1 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07* 1.00
5. SCOPE 0.41 0.49 0 1 0.10* 0.11* 0.08* 0.06* 1.00
6. RADICALITY 3.92 1.61 1 7 0.19* 0.12* 0.25* -0.01 -0.12* 1.00
7. PROTECTION 0.00 0.68 -4.95 1.62 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.16* 0.07* 0.02 1.00
8. INDUSTRY 0.49 0.50 0 1 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06* 0.00 -0.01 -0.13* 0.06* 1.00
9. YEAR 1995.90 2.37 1994 2003 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.07* -0.08* -0.05 -0.12* -0.16* 1.00 
 
     Note: N=1159; * p<.05 
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Overall, as shown in Tables 7.2 and 7.3, the theoretical model of partner 
selection as a protective mechanism suggested in Chapter III and illustrated in Figure 3.1 
is generally supported by the data. Below, I review the statistical evidence of each 
hypothesis in turn.  
Hypothesis 1a. The more radical the innovation goals of the R&D alliance, 
the more likely the alliance partners are to be Friends rather than Strangers. 
Hypothesis 1b. The more radical the innovation goals of the R&D alliance, 
the less likely the alliance partners are to be Acquaintances rather than 
Strangers. 
Estimation results for this set of hypotheses are shown in Table 7.2, which 
includes several multinominal logistic regressions. Model 1 and 2 include only control 
variables; Model 3 and 4 add independent variables. With respect to radicality of 
innovation that an R&D alliance intends to develop, I find, as predicted, that 
RADICALITY has a negative coefficient when comparing Acquaintance against 
Strangers. The negative coefficient is at the 1% or lower significance level (Model 3 in 
Table 7.2: β = -0.19, p<0.01). When comparing Friend against Strangers, RADICALITY 
has a positive coefficient at the 1% or lower significance level (Model 4 in Table 7.2: β 
= 0.41, p<0.001). Therefore, strong support is found for the predicted effects of 
innovation radicality that, when innovation radicality is high, R&D alliances are more 
likely to be formed between Friends than Strangers (Hypothesis 1a), but less likely to be 
formed between Acquaintances than Strangers (Hypothesis 1b).  
 
 TABLE 7.2.  
Multinominal Logistic Regression (Domestic Bilateral R&D Alliances) 
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 Model 1  Model 2 
(ACQ) (FRD) 
Model 3 
(ACQ) 
Model 4 
(FRD) 
Model 5 
(ACQ) 
Model 6 
(FRD) 
Control variables       
Industry 0.01  -0.42 ** -0.07  -0.21  -0.07  -0.19  
Scope 0.43 * 0.48 ** 0.33 † 0.70 *** 0.33 † 0.70 ***
Equity 0.30  -0.57 * 0.35  -0.63 * 0.35  -0.63 *
Independent variables       
Radicality -  -  -0.19 ** 0.41 *** -0.20 ** 0.42 ***
Protection -  -  0.12  -0.00  0.09  0.48  
Radicality * Protection -  -  -  -  0.01  -0.12  
Intercept -2.18 *** -1.40 *** -1.44 *** -3.27 *** -1.44 † -3.31 ***
N    1159 1159 1159
LR-chi2 42.87* 121.01*** 122.45***
 
Notes: 
1. ACQ = Acquaintance. FRD = Friend. The comparison baseline is Stranger. 
2. Two-tailed t statistics where †  p< .10,  *  p< .05,  ** p< .01,  *** p< .001 
3. Because of the space limit, I did not include individual coefficients on year dummies in this table. 
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Hypothesis 2a. The weaker the intellectual property rights protection, the 
more likely the alliance partners are to be Friends rather than Strangers. 
Hypothesis 2b. The weaker the intellectual property rights protection, the 
more likely the alliance partners are to be Acquaintances than Strangers. 
Unfortunately, neither of the coefficients on PROTECTION is statistically 
significant in Model 3 and 4 in Table 7.2. Thus the sample does not provide any 
empirical support for Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b on the effects of intellectual 
property protection in the local market. 
Hypothesis 3a. Intellectual property rights protection weakens the positive 
relationship between the radicality of innovation goals of the R&D alliance 
and the likelihood of alliance formation between Friends rather than 
Strangers. 
Hypothesis 3b. Intellectual property rights protection weakens the negative 
relationship between the radicality of innovation goals of the R&D alliance 
and the likelihood of alliance formation between Acquaintances rather than 
Strangers. 
To test the interacting effect proposed, Model 5 and 6 in Table 7.2 add the 
interaction term between RADICALITY and PROTECTION. None of the coefficients of 
the interaction term is statistically significant; therefore, the arguments regarding the 
weakening moderation effects proposed in Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b are not 
supported.   
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I now turn to the second estimation concerning the dynamic aspects of alliance 
formation decisions. As shown in Table 7.3, these three decision variables are closely 
entangled and interacting with one another. I conduct 3SLS with two measures regarding 
prior partners. Using the Hausman specification tests (Durbin & Waston, 1971; 
Hausman, 1978; Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993), we compared our OLS models to 
3SLS models, and 3SLS models are preferred in all cases. 
I first use PRIOR to include both Acquaintance and Friend partners; I then use a 
more rigorous measure FRIEND to include Friend partners only. Therefore, the second 
measure reflects prior successful collaborations rather than simply previous interactions 
as represented by PRIOR. Although these two 3SLS regression models provides the 
same results, the one with FRIENDS as a rigorous measure of previous successful 
cooperation offers much stronger evidence than the one with PRIOR as a simpler 
measure. 
Hypothesis 4a. When the R&D alliance is structured as an equity joint 
venture, the likelihood is lower that the alliance partners are prior partners. 
Hypothesis 4b. When the R&D alliance is between prior partners, the 
likelihood is lower that the alliance governance structure is an equity joint 
venture.  
As predicted in Hypotheses 4a and 4b, the coefficient on EQUITY is negative 
and statistically significant in the PRIOR/FRIEND equations (PRIOR equation: β = -
0.07, p<0.10; FRIEND equation: β = -0.16, p<0.001) and the coefficients on PRIOR and 
FRIENDS are positive and statistically significant in EQUITY equations (PRIOR as  
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TABLE 7.3.  
Three-Stage Least Squares Regression 
 
3SLS with PRIOR, EQUITY, and SCOPE as exogenous variables 
 PRIOR EQUITY SCOPE 
Prior -  -0.43 † 0.25 ***
Equity -0.07 † -  0.20 ***
Scope 0.21 *** 0.11 *** -  
Radicality 0.04 *** 0.00  -0.05 ***
Protection 0.00  -0.12 *** 0.06 *
Industry -0.03 * 0.00  -0.04  
Intercept 0.06  0.93 *** 0.56 ***
N 1159  1159  1159  
Chi2 95.00 *** 106.21 *** 136.42 ***
3SLS with FRIEND, EQUITY, and SCOPE as exogenous variables 
 FRIEND EQUITY SCOPE 
Friend -  -0.14 *** 0.30 ***
Equity -0.16 *** -  0.23 ***
Scope 0.18 *** 0.12 *** -  
Radicality 0.06 *** 0.01  -0.06 ***
Protection -0.02  -0.12 *** 0.06 *
Industry -0.02  0.00  -0.04  
Intercept -0.11 ** 0.04  0.61 ***
N 1159  1159  1159  
Chi2 170.04 *** 132.02 *** 137.40 ***
 
Notes:  
1. Two-tailed t statistics where † p< .10,  *  p< .05,  ** p< .01,  *** p< .001. 
2. Because of the space limit, I did not include individual coefficients on year dummies in this 
table. 
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independent variable: β = -0.43, p<0.10; FRIEND as independent variable: β = -0.14, 
p<0.001).  Thus, when alliance scope is organized in a protective governance structure, 
the need to select partners with strong-form trust is reduced. On the other hand, when the 
alliance is organized between trustworthy partners, firms are less likely to adopt an 
expensive governance structure such as an equity-based joint venture.  Therefore, I find 
a substitution effect between governance and selection of prior partner, as predicted in 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b.  
Hypothesis 5a. When the alliance scope is broad, the likelihood is higher 
that the alliance partners are prior partners.  
Hypothesis 5b. When the R&D alliance is between prior partners, the 
likelihood is higher that the alliance scope is broad. 
As suggested by Hypotheses 5a and 5b, the coefficient on SCOPE is positive and 
statistically significant in the PRIOR/FRIEND equations (PRIOR equation: β = 0.21, 
p<0.01; FRIEND equation: β = 0.18, p<0.001) and the coefficients on PRIOR and 
FRIENDS are positive and statistically significant in SCOPE equations (PRIOR as 
independent variable: β = 0.25, p<0.001; FRIEND as independent variable: β = 0.30, 
p<0.001).  The results suggest that when alliance scope is narrowed, the need to select 
partners with strong-form trust to address knowledge leakage concerns is reduced. 
Conversely, when the alliance is organized between trustworthy partners, firms are more 
wiling to engage in activities of broad scope. Thus, the substitution effect between 
alliance scope and selection of prior partner is found, as predicted in Hypothesis 5a and 
5b.  
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Also, consistent with Oxley and Sampson (2004), I detect the substitution 
relationship between governance and alliance scope. The coefficient on EQUITY is 
positive and statistically significant in the SCOPE equation (PRIOR as an independent 
variable: β = 0.20, p<0.001; FRIEND as an independent variable: β = 0.23, p<0.001) and 
the coefficient on SCOPE is positive and statistically significant in the EQUITY 
equation (PRIOR as an independent variable: β = 0.11, p<0.001; FRIEND as an 
independent variable: β = 0.12, p<0.001). That is, when alliance scope is narrowed, the 
need to govern alliance activities in a protective structure such as joint venture is 
reduced. On the contrary, when the alliance is organized as a joint venture involving 
equity investment, the partners are more wiling to engage in activities of broad scope. 
Therefore, the substitution effect between governance and alliance scope is found, as the 
literature predicted (Oxley & Sampson, 2004).  
There is an additional interesting finding worth noting. In Table 7.3, the 
coefficient on RADICALITY is positive and statistically significant in PRIOR and 
FRIEND equations (PRIOR equation: β = 0.04, p < 0.001; FRIEND equation: β  = 0.06, 
p < 0.001), but not in EQUITY equations. The coefficient on PROTECTION is negative 
and statistically significant in EQUITY equations, but not in PRIOR/FRIEND equations 
(with PRIOR as an independent variable: β = -0.12, p < 0.001; with FRIEND as an 
independent variable: β  = -0.12, p < 0.001). This finding suggests that firms may 
employ mechanisms to address different concerns (in this case, concerns stemming from 
internal versus external) in protecting their technological assets. Detailed discussion in 
this regard can be found in Chapter VIII.
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DOMESTIC VERSUS INTERNATIONAL R&D ALLIANCES 
Table 7.4 demonstrates eight comparison pairs to test hypotheses proposed in 
Chapter IV.  
Hypothesis 6. The likelihood of alliance formation between prior partners is 
greater in an international than a domestic R&D alliance.  
Hypothesis 6 suggests that alliance formation between prior partners is more 
likely to be observed in international than domestic R&D alliances. The first two t-tests 
in Table 7.4 are used to test this hypothesis – one with the measure of prior partner 
including both Acquaintances and Friends (PRIOR), one with the measure of prior 
partner including Friends only (FRIEND). Unfortunately, none of the t-values are 
statistically significant at p < 5% level. Therefore, my data do not support the arguments 
on different partner selection preferences between domestic and international R&D 
alliances. 
 
 TABLE 7.4.  
Comparison across Groups (Domestic versus International R&D Alliances) 
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          # Variable  Mean N S.D. Mean N S.D. Hypothesis T-value
  Domestic R&D alliances (D) International R&D alliances (I)   
1. PRIOR 0.29 1159 0.45 0.30 762 0.46 H6: D < I -0.42 (n.s.) 
2. FRIEND 0.18 1159 0.38 0.19 762 0.39 H6: D < I -0.36 (n.s.) 
  TRDA IRDA   
3. PRIOR 0.24 46 0.43 0.29 679 0.45 H7: TRDA>IRDA -0.74 (n.s.) 
  TRDA DRDA   
4. PRIOR       0.24 46 0.43 0.46 37 0.51 H7: TRDA>DRDA -2.14*
  IRDA DRDA   
5. PRIOR       0.29 679 0.45 0.46 37 0.51 H7: IRDA>DRDA -2.20*
  TRDA IRDA   
6. FRIEND 0.17 46 0.38 0.19 679 0.39 H7: TRDA>IRDA -0.22 (n.s.) 
  TRDA DRDA   
7. FRIEND 0.17 46 0.38 0.16 37 0.37 H7: TRDA>DRDA 0.14 (n.s.) 
  IRDA DRDA   
8. FRIEND 0.19 679 0.39 0.16 37 0.37 H7: IRDA>DRDA -0.38 (n.s.) 
  
Notes:  
1. TRDA = trinational R&D alliances. IRDA = traditional international R&D alliances. DRDA = cross-national domestic R&D alliances. 
2. One-tailed t statistics where * p<.05. 
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Hypothesis 7. The likelihood of selecting prior partners for international 
R&D alliances decreases in the sequence of TRDA > IRDA > DRDA.  
T-tests #3 ~ #8 are used to examine whether alliance formation between prior 
partners is more likely in TRDA than IRDA, TRDA than DRDA, and IRDA than 
DRDA. T-tests #3 ~ #5 conduct the comparison employing the measure of prior partner 
including both Acquaintances and Friends (PRIOR); T-tests #4 ~ #8 with the measure of 
prior partner including Friends only (FRIEND). Support is found that alliance formation 
between prior partners (including Acquaintances and Friends) is more likely in TRDA (t 
= -2.14; p < 0.05) and IRDA(t = -2.20; p < 0.05), than in DRDA. In other words, DRDA 
is the least likely to be formed between prior partners. However, the same tests with a 
narrower measure of prior partner (Friends only) generated no statistically significant 
results. Therefore, I conclude that Hypothesis 7 is partially supported. Further discussion 
on the insignificant findings can be found in next chapter.  
BILATERAL VERSUS MULTILATERAL R&D ALLIANCES 
Table 7.5 demonstrates descriptive statistics for the sample of 1423 R&D 
alliances included in the empirical analysis. The majority of the sample alliances (81 
percent) are bilateral while 19 percent are multilateral with at least three firms. Fifteen 
percent of the sample alliances are equity joint ventures, the remainder being contractual 
alliances. Descriptive statistics of other variables are similar to those generated by the 
first sample of 1153 bilateral R&D alliances (See Table 7.1). Again, multicollinearity 
between variables was checked carefully and was not a problem. 
 
 
 TABLE 7.5.  
Descriptive Statistics (Domestic Bilateral and Multilateral R&D Alliances) 
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             Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1.                PARTNER 1.52 0.81 1 3 1.00
2.               
              
              
               
            
               
           
             
       
PRIOR 0.31 0.46 0 1 0.94* 1.00
3. FRIEND 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.92* 0.75* 1.00
4. EQUITY 0.18 0.39 0 1 -0.05* -0.03 -0.08* 1.00
5. SCOPE 0.41 0.49 0 1 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.08* 1.00
6. RADICALITY 3.97 1.54 1 7 0.21* 0.15* 0.25* -0.04 -0.15* 1.00
7. PROTECTION 0.00 0.84 -4.86 1.35 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.25* 0.03 0.04 1.00
8. INDUSTRY 0.46 0.50 0 1 -0.07* -0.06* -0.08* -0.01 0.02 -0.16* 0.08* 1.00
9. YEAR 1996.00 2.48 1994 2003 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.05 -0.08* -0.00 -0.07* -0.16* 1.00
10. MULTILATERAL 0.19 0.39 0 1 0.14* 0.13* 0.13* 0.16* -0.02 0.07* -0.23* -0.11* 0.08* 1.00 
 
  Notes: N=1423; * p<.05 
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Hypothesis 8. The likelihood of alliance between prior partners is higher in 
a multilateral than a bilateral R&D alliance.   
Hypothesis 8 proposes that alliance formation between prior partners is more 
likely to be observed in multilateral than bilateral R&D alliances. The first two t-tests in 
Table 7.6 are used to test this hypothesis – one with the measure of prior partner 
including both Acquaintances and Friends (PRIOR), one with the measure of prior 
partner including Friends only (FRIEND). Both t-tests indicate show support for this 
hypothesis (comparison on PRIOR: t = -4.87, p < 0.001; on FRIEND: t = -4.98, p < 
0.001).  
TABLE 7.6.  
Comparison across Groups (Bilateral versus Multilateral R&D Alliances) 
 
# Variable  Mean N S.D. Mean N S.D. Hypothesis T-value  
  Bilateral R&D alliances 
(B)
Multilateral R&D alliances 
(M)
  
1. PRIOR 0.29 1159 0.45 0.44 264 0.50 H8: B < M -4.87***
2. FRIEND 0.18 1159 0.38 0.31 264 0.47 H8: B < M -4.98***
  
Note: One-tailed t statistics where *** p<.001. 
 
Three hypotheses were proposed regarding the moderating effects of alliance 
multilateralism on the causal relationships between partner selection and innovation 
radicality and intellectual property protection.  
Hypothesis 9a. The positive relationship between the radicality of 
innovations to be developed and the likelihood of alliance formation between 
Friends is stronger in a multilateral than a bilateral R&D alliance. 
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Hypothesis 9b. The negative relationship between the radicality of 
innovations to be developed and the likelihood of alliance formation between 
Acquaintances is stronger in a multilateral than a bilateral R&D alliance. 
Hypothesis 10. The negative relationship between the intellectual property 
protection offered by the local market and the likelihood of alliance 
formation between prior partners is stronger in a multilateral than a 
bilateral R&D alliance. 
Estimation results for these two sets of hypotheses are shown in Table 7.7, which 
includes several multinominal logistic regressions. Model 1 and 2 include only control 
variables; Model 3 and 4 add independent variables – RADICALITY, PROTECTION 
and MULTILATERAL. Similar results on RADICALITY and PROTECTION are 
generated as those in Table 7.2. MULTILATERAL has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient when comparing FRIEND again STRANGER (Model 4 in Table 
7.7: β = 0.86, p<0.001). This confirms what I found in the t-tests presented in Table 7.6; 
alliance formation between prior partners is more likely in multilateral than bilateral 
R&D alliances. Models 5 and 6 add the interaction between RADICALITY and 
MULTILATERAL; Models 7 and 8 add the interaction between PROTECTION and 
MULTILATERAL. However, none of the coefficient estimates supports the predictions 
made in Hypotheses 9 and 10.  
 
 TABLE 7.7.  
Multinominal Logistic Regression (Domestic Bilateral and Multilateral R&D Alliances) 
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 Model 1  Model 2 
(ACQ) (FRD) 
Model 3 
(ACQ) 
Model 4 
(FRD) 
Model 5 
(ACQ) 
Model 6 
(FRD) 
Model 7 
(ACQ) 
Model 8 
(FRD) 
Control variables           
Industry    -0.07  -0.44 ** -0.11  -0.12  -0.08 -0.11  -0.11 -0.12  
Scope    0.24  0.21 ** 0.22  0.43 ** 0.25 0.44 ** 0.21 0.43 **
Equity    0.29  -0.54 ** 0.26  -0.60 ** 0.30 -0.58 ** 0.26 -0.60 **
Independent variables          
Radicality --  --  -0.14 * 0.47 *** -0.20 ** 0.40 *** -0.14 * 0.42 ***
Protection  --  --  0.08  0.09  0.05  0.08  0.13 0.08  
Multilateral  --  --  0.32  0.86 *** -1.75 * 0.20  0.30 0.86 ***
Radicality * Multilateral --  --  --  --  0.52 ** 0.16  --  --  
Protection * Multilateral --  --  --  --  --  --  -0.08  0.03  
Intercept -1.92 *** -1.10 *** -1.46 *** -3.24 *** -1.32 *** -3.19 *** -1.47 *** -3.23 ***
N     1423 1423 1423 1423
LR-chi2 37.59* 144.77*** 152.46*** 144.95***
 
Notes: 
1. ACQ = Acquaintance. FRD = Friend. The comparison baseline is Stranger. 
2. Two-tailed t statistics where †  p< .10,  *  p< .05,  ** p< .01,  *** p< .001 
3. Because of the space limit, I did not include individual coefficients on year dummies in this table. 
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SUMMARY  
This chapter presents the empirical evidence regarding partner selection as a 
protective mechanism to cope with R&D alliance partner firms’ concerns about 
knowledge leakage. As predicted, evidence supports that, in contrast to Strangers, firms 
are more likely to select Friends for new R&D alliances intending to develop radical 
innovations. However, firms are less likely to select Acquaintances than Strangers. I also 
detect a substitution effect among partner selection, governance structure and alliance 
scope.  That is, these three decisions are used as alternative mechanisms by firms to 
protect their valuable technological assets from being appropriated in R&D 
collaborations. Moreover, firms do not seem to have different preferences regarding 
partner selection for international and domestic R&D alliances. However, it is found that 
alliance formation between prior partners is the least likely in DRDA, in contrast to 
IRDA and TDA. Finally, firms are more careful about partner selection and tend to 
choose their prior partners when the number of participants increases (i.e., multilateral 
R&D alliances), than when the number of partners is two.  A further discussion of these 
empirical results will be presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
DISCUSSION 
This chapter discusses the results presented in the preceding chapter. 
Corresponding to the structure of the preceding chapters, this chapter is divided into 
three major sections. The first section discusses the results regarding partner selection as 
a protective mechanism in R&D alliances in general; the second section discusses the 
results regarding the comparison between domestic and international R&D alliances and 
among three types of international R&D alliances, on partner selection; and the final 
section discusses the results regarding the comparison between bilateral and multilateral 
R&D alliances.  
PARTNER SELECTION AS A KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION MECHANISM  
Chapter III proposes that the more radical the innovation goals of the R&D 
alliance, the more likely are the alliance partners to be Friends rather than Strangers and, 
on the contrary, the less likely are the alliance partners to be Acquaintances than 
Strangers. By examining the sample composed of R&D alliances involving high-
technology companies, these arguments receive strong support in the present study.  
Decisions to select different partners are made as a response to the elevated leakage 
concerns associated with knowledge sharing. When an R&D alliance seeks radical 
innovation development and the exposure of valuable knowledge is high, firms are 
extremely cautious in selecting their partners. In such a situation, they are more likely to 
select Friends than Strangers as alliance partners, but intentionally avoid Acquaintances 
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that are able to appropriate the focal firm’s technological assets more easily than 
Strangers.  
Chapter III also proposes that the stronger the intellectual property rights 
protection, the less likely are the alliance partners to be prior partners (Acquaintances or 
Friends) rather than Strangers. Data employed in the present study did not offer support 
for these arguments. Additional analysis of the dynamic aspects of alliance formation 
seems to offer insights regarding these insignificant findings. Although not 
hypothesized, it is worth noting that different protection mechanisms may be employed 
to cope with various leakage concerns. Governance design is used to deal with the 
ineffective external protection mechanism provided by the market; whereas, partner 
selection is used to manage the internal contacts with partners which are required by the 
objective of R&D collaborations (i.e., to develop radical or incremental innovations).   
Regarding the dynamic aspects of alliance formation, Chapter III proposes 
substitution relationships among partner selection, governance structure, and alliance 
scope as mechanisms to address firms’ concerns about knowledge leakage in R&D 
alliances. For R&D alliance formation, firms consider governance structure, alliance 
scope and partner selection simultaneously; one decision affects the other two. The 
results provide strong support for the hypothesis that selecting trustworthy partners 
substitutes for protective governance structures and narrower alliance scope in R&D 
alliances, and vice versa. Specifically, when a prior partner is selected to form an R&D 
alliance, it is less likely for the alliance to be governed by equity commitment and it is 
more likely for the alliance to expand the cooperation to a broad scope. On the contrary, 
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when a non-equity-based governance structure is utilized for a new R&D alliance or a 
broad alliance scope is crafted, participating firms are more likely to select their prior 
partners to ease their concerns about partners’ potential appropriation of their valuable 
technological assets.  In addition, consistent with the literature, the substitution effects 
between governance structure and alliance scope are also detected. In sum, these three 
decisions represent a dynamic and endogenous system as predicted in Chapter III.  
DOMESTIC VERSUS INTERNATIONAL R&D ALLIANCES 
Chapter IV proposes that, in contrast to domestic ones, international R&D 
alliances are more likely to be formed between prior partners. However, the comparison 
between 1159 domestic R&D alliances and 762 international R&D alliances does not 
display any difference regarding partner selection. It seems that whether or not partners 
are from the same country does not affect firms’ partner selection in the context of 
technology protection. This raises the question whether the internationalized economy 
has really merged countries as a “global village.” Cultural and institutional differences 
do not seem to be so critical for firms, at least in high-technology industries.  
In-depth examination of three types of international R&D alliances suggests that 
trinational R&D alliances (TRDA) are the most likely, and cross-national domestic R&D 
alliances (DRDA) the least likely, to be formed between prior partners. Results were 
found to support the hypothesis that DRDA is the less likely to be formed between prior 
partners compared to both TRDA and traditional international R&D alliances (IRDA). 
However, the argument that TRDA is the most likely to be formed between prior 
partners did not receive any support. Therefore, it seems that firms are cautious about the 
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complexity resulting from different nationalities of partner firms, which raises more 
concerns about knowledge protection. Firms with different national backgrounds rely 
more on prior relationships and trust built through prior interactions than firms with the 
same national background. Yet, when the complexity stems from partner firms’ 
nationalities, involving a third country (where their R&D alliance is located) does not 
seem to concern the partner firms. This may be because firms have to be internationally 
experienced enough to form TRDAs, the most complicated type of international R&D 
alliances. Future research in this regard is promising and will be further discussed in next 
chapter.  
BILATERAL VERSUS MULTILATERAL R&D ALLIANCES 
Chapter V hypothesizes that, in contrast to bilateral ones, multilateral R&D 
alliances are more likely to be formed between prior partners. The comparison between 
1159 bilateral R&D alliances and 264 multilateral R&D alliances indicate strong support 
for this hypothesis. When multiple partner firms are involved and direct monitoring is 
difficult, trust is relied on more to address partner firms’ concerns about knowledge 
leakage in R&D alliances.  
I argued that the causal relationships between partner selection and radicality of 
innovation developed by an R&D alliance and intellectual property protection are 
moderated by the number of partners in R&D alliance. No statistically significant results 
were found to support these arguments. This indicates that multilateral R&D alliances 
may be more complicated than the arguments presented herein predicted. When the 
innovation that an R&D alliance intends to develop is radical, firms may try to involve 
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as many partners as possible. On the one hand, involving more partners decreases the 
risks shared by each partner because the more the radical innovation is, the more risks 
will be borne by the innovation developers. On the other hand, radical innovations often 
require more resources (financial, human resources, etc.) than incremental innovations. 
Firms may need multiple partners involved to develop radical innovations. Under these 
situations, innovation radicality may be the cause for an R&D alliance’s multilateralism. 
Similar logic can be applied to the relationship between intellectual property protection 
and R&D alliance multilateralism. Future research avenues in this regard are suggested 
in the next chapter. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter discusses the empirical evidence regarding partner selection as a 
protective mechanism that firms can utilize in their R&D alliances. While all three 
protective mechanisms – partner selection, governance structure, and alliance scope – 
can be used alternatively to address partner firms’ concerns about knowledge leakage, 
partner selection seems to be utilized to address concerns stemming internally from 
innovation characteristics. Governance structure seems to be employed to address such 
concerns originating externally from weak intellectual property protection. Moreover, 
partner selection for international and multilateral R&D alliances appears to be more 
complicated than what this dissertation predicts. At least in high-tech industries, firms 
are becoming less culturally sensitive than before. There is no preference difference in 
partner selection between domestic and international R&D alliances. Further, 
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multilateral R&D alliances may be formed to cope with high risks and great resource 
requirements by radical innovations. 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS 
This concluding chapter summarizes both the theory and the empirical evidence 
of the present study, discusses its limitations, and points out its implications for future 
strategy research related to R&D alliances, particularly partner selection for R&D 
alliances. I also discuss implications for managerial practice that are suggested by my 
findings.   
CONCLUSIONS  
Partner selection is an important strategic issue for all firms engaging in R&D 
alliances. The present research is a first effort in studying partner selection from the 
perspective of knowledge protection in R&D alliances.  
The literature review in Chapter II concludes that knowledge protection in R&D 
alliance has important implications to the chances of alliance success. Prior researchers 
have proposed two mechanisms to promote knowledge sharing and knowledge 
protection – protective governances and/or narrow alliance scope. As a possible 
mechanism to be utilized by firms to protect their technological assets in R&D alliances, 
partner selection has not received appropriate attention in the literature. Relevant 
research is incomplete, and publications on partner selection as a mechanism to protect 
knowledge in R&D alliances have not appeared in the literature. With R&D alliances 
becoming increasingly complex, as evidenced by the heightened number of international 
and multilateral R&D alliances, careful partner selection is even more critical when 
firms decide to expose their valuable technological assets to collaborating parties. 
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However, these new phenomena have not received appropriate attention in the literature, 
and knowledge protection in these R&D alliances has not been investigated. 
This dissertation first analyzes how the knowledge leakage concerns raised by 
the radicality of innovation that an R&D alliance intends to develop and the intellectual 
property protection in a market can affect firms’ preference in different types of partners.  
The analysis was started by categorizing potential partners that a firm may select for its 
R&D alliances. It is hypothesized that R&D alliances are more likely to be formed 
between Friends, but less likely to be between Acquaintances, than Strangers when the 
innovation to be developed is radical. I also propose that R&D alliances are more likely 
to be formed between prior partners (either Friends or Acquaintances) than Strangers 
when the intellectual property protection provided by the external market is weak.  
Considering the increasing number of international and multilateral R&D 
alliances, R&D alliances are becoming more and more complex. The present study 
conducts an in-depth analysis on partner selection in these two types of alliances. I 
propose that international R&D alliances have a higher likelihood of being formed 
between prior partners than their domestic counterparts. Considering the complexity in 
R&D alliances stemming from national and/or organizational cultural differences, three 
kinds of international R&D alliances are categorized – cross-national domestic (DRDA), 
traditional international (IRDA), and trinational (TRDA) R&D alliances. It is 
hypothesized that the likelihood of alliance formation between prior partners can be 
ranked as TRDA > IRDA > DRDA. 
 
 105
I also propose that multilateral R&D alliances have a higher likelihood of being 
formed between prior partners than their bilateral counterparts. When the number of 
partners increases, the management of R&D collaboration is complicated. From a social 
exchange perspective, the present study argues that multilateral R&D alliance is featured 
by partners’ concerns about higher risks of others’ opportunism and more reliance on 
trust to govern their collaborations. Therefore, alliance formation between prior partners 
is more likely in multilateral R&D alliances, and whether an R&D alliance is 
multilateral moderates the causal relationships between partner selection and innovation 
radicality and intellectual property protection. 
Empirical evidence provides support for the effects of innovation radicality on 
R&D alliance partner selection. The type of innovation an R&D alliance intends to 
develop has a strong impact on partner selection. In order to protect their valuable 
technological assets, firms are more likely to choose Friends, but less likely to choose 
Acquaintances, than Strangers to form R&D alliances. 
Strong support was found regarding the relationships among the three protective 
mechanisms – partner selection, governance structure, and alliance scope. As predicted, 
when a non-equity-based governance structure is utilized for a new R&D alliance or a 
broad alliance scope is crafted, participating firms are more likely to select prior partners 
to ease their concerns about partners’ potential appropriation of their valuable 
technological assets. On the contrary, when a prior partner is selected to form an R&D 
alliance, it is likely that the alliance will be governed by a equity commitment and it is 
more likely for the alliance to expand the cooperation to a broad scope. Further, firms 
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seem to use partner selection to address concerns stemming internally from innovation 
characteristics, and to use governance structure to address concerns originating 
externally from weak intellectual property protection.   
Evidence was also found to support the argument that multilateral R&D alliances 
are more likely to be formed between prior partners than bilateral ones. However, no 
support was found that international R&D alliances are different from domestic ones in 
their partner selection when considering protecting partner firms’ technological assets. 
Yet, differences across different types of international R&D alliances were found; 
DRDA is the less likely to be formed between prior partners than IRDA and TRDA. The 
lack of evidence for several other hypotheses leads to deeper thoughts of international 
and multilateral R&D alliances and the conclusion that partner selection for international 
and multilateral R&D alliances may be more complicated than what this dissertation 
predicts. 
Overall, the findings from the present study conclude that (1) the more radical 
the innovation that an R&D alliance intends to develop, the more likely the alliance is 
formed between Friends, but the less likely between Acquaintances, than Strangers; (2) 
partner selection, governance structure, and alliance scope can be used as substitution 
mechanisms to address firms’ concerns of protecting their technological assets in R&D 
alliances; (3) firms forming DRDAs are less likely to select their prior partners than 
those forming IRDAs and TRDAs; and (4) multilateral R&D alliances are more likely to 
be formed between prior partners than bilateral ones.  
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IMPLICATIONS  
By focusing on partner selection, the present study provides new insights to our 
understanding of knowledge protection in R&D alliances. It first recognizes the 
competitive implications of the potential loss of control of technological assets in R&D 
alliances, and focuses on partner selection as a decision variable in addressing such 
concerns about knowledge leakage. The most common empirical approach in prior 
literature has been to “take-partners-as-given” and studies the performance outcome of 
other decision variables such as governance structure. In this dissertation, I was able to 
examine why firms select prior partners for the purpose of protecting their proprietary 
assets in R&D alliances, by focusing on the process rather than simply the outcome.  
Second, this study enriches our understanding of trust between alliance partners. 
Diverging from the literature traditionally employing prior interaction as a proxy of trust, 
I argue that there is a clear distinction between Acquaintance and Friend, at least in the 
context of technology protection. Both are prior partners; Acquaintances and Friends are 
different in the degree of trust between firms, but similar in the low extent of 
information asymmetry. Such a differentiation is more salient when close interaction is 
needed for R&D collaborations. To protect their valuable technological assets, firms 
tend to select their Friends as partners for new R&D alliances, while trying to avoid 
Acquaintances which can appropriate their technologies more easily than Strangers. The 
empirical analysis offers support for such arguments.  
Third, this dissertation examines a dynamic process of alliance formation, 
enabling us to understand how the three decision variables – who (partner selection), 
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how (alliance governance), and what (alliance scope) – substitute for each other when 
firms form R&D alliances. Firms that are able to benefit from R&D collaboration and at 
the same time effectively protect their own valuable knowledge are those that will 
maintain their competitive advantage and succeed in market competition. Although the 
current research is still preliminary, the analysis presented here suggests that this is a line 
of inquiry with potentially important implications for the theory and management of 
inter-firm alliances (see discussion below in the section “Implications for Theory 
Development”).   
Fourth, the current study provides evidence that non-conventional forms of 
international R&D alliances are frequently occurring and are important organizational 
forms. This study also offers a comparison of different types of international R&D 
alliances regarding their implications for partner selection when there are knowledge 
protection considerations. It does so by introducing a new typology of international 
R&D alliances. This research demonstrates that cross-nation domestic R&D alliances are 
the most modest scenario with the lowest knowledge leakage concerns, and therefore are 
least likely to be formed between firms that enjoy high levels of trust, than trinational 
and traditional international R&D alliances. The in-depth analysis of various types of 
international R&D alliances enriches our understanding of how to protect participants’ 
valuable knowledge in R&D collaboration across borders.  
Lastly, the analysis of multilateral R&D alliances, by examining their exchange 
processes, contributes not only to the literature on partner selection but also to the larger 
body of literature on alliances. When the number of partners increases, the knowledge 
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leakage concerns in R&D alliances are more serious. Such a complicated inter-firm 
relationship has not been analyzed in previous studies. This dissertation fills the research 
gap by analyzing partner selection as a mechanism to protect partner firms’ 
technological assets in bilateral and multilateral R&D alliances from the perspective of 
social exchange theory.  
Furthermore, this dissertation has several significant implications for both 
academic research and managerial practice. 
Implications for Future Research 
One of the most important contributions of this study is that it points out and 
empirically demonstrates that partner selection can be used as a protective mechanism in 
R&D alliance. This has significant implications for research on R&D alliances.  
First, the present study suggests that the partner selection decision is an important 
aspect of alliance management. The analyses presented in this dissertation suggest that 
alliance managers can and do pay attention to the potential loss of valuable technological 
assets in a R&D collaboration. The study also reaffirms some of the main conclusions of 
previous studies of alliance organization undertaken within the transaction cost 
economics tradition. Specifically, protective governance structures are available for 
firms to choose to secure their valuable technologies. 
Second, it is fascinating to note that different mechanisms are used to manage 
different knowledge leakage issues. I found that governance design was used to deal 
with the ineffective external protection mechanism provided by the market, and partner 
selection was used to manage the internal contacts with partners that were demanded by 
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the objective of R&D collaborations. This additional finding is interesting because the 
extant literature has traditionally attributed the explanatory power to governance design 
while treating partner selection as given. Although the present study is far from 
definitive in this regard, it does suggest an important avenue for future research on 
alliance management. 
Third, the present study makes a first endeavor in pushing forward the 
categorizing and measuring Acquaintances and Friends; more attention should be given 
to this issue. While one good prior interaction may be much better than the sum of 
several failed alliances, the current measures were not able to capture such differences. 
Follow-up studies on the characteristics of prior alliances (such as activities involved, 
time duration of alliances) should be promising. A related future research suggestion is 
the issue of Acquaintance firms. I included in this study the analysis of Acquaintances in 
a general manner; a detailed examination of Acquaintances is necessary. For example, 
how do Acquaintances with unpleasant experiences consider each other as potential 
partners for new R&D alliances? What about Acquaintances involved in serious law 
suits (in this case, Acquaintances may become enemies)?  
Additional complexity stems from the definition of “prior relationship” in 
multilateral alliances. In this study, I looked at only the focal firm and the second 
partner. But what about the foal and the second partner firm’s joint consideration for the 
third partner, the fourth, and …? Therefore, a network perspective may be needed to 
develop more accurate measurements of prior partners in multilateral alliances.  
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Fourth, multilateral R&D alliances are complex, not only because it is difficult to 
define who are prior partners, but also because the complicated relationship with 
incentives in these alliances. For instance, when the innovation that an R&D alliance 
intends to develop is radical, firms may try to involve as many partners as possible. On 
the one hand, involving more partners will decrease the risks shared by each partner 
because the more the radical innovation is, the more risks will be borne by the 
innovation developers. On the other, radical innovations often require more resources 
(financial, human resources, etc.) than incremental ones. Firms may need multiple 
partners involved to make it possible to develop radical innovations. Under these 
situations, innovation radicality can be the cause for an R&D alliance’s multilateralism. 
Similar logic can be applied to the relationship between intellectual property protection 
and R&D alliance multilateralism. Future research avenues in this regard will be of 
particular interest to alliance scholars. 
Fifth, I found that whether an R&D alliance is international did not affect firms’ 
partner selection in the context of technology protection. This raises the question 
whether the internationalized economy has really merged countries as a “global village.” 
Cultural and institutional differences do not seem to be so critical for firms, at least in 
high-technology industries. Therefore, a modification of the traditional international 
business literature may be necessary.  
Additionally, the analysis of international R&D alliances base on regionalization 
rather than globalization may be interesting. Some scholars, such as Alan Rugman, have 
argued that there is no globalized company, only regionalized company (Rugman, 2000; 
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Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). The three regions – US, EU, and Japan – compose the 
majority of “globalization.” Interestingly, such arguments are evidenced by my sample. 
Therefore, I call for analyses focusing on these three regions either as the R&D alliance 
host country or partners’ home countries. Further investigation on specific combination 
of these regions in R&D alliance would also be promising. For example, R&D alliances 
with EU focal firms and U.S. partners should differ from those with the same focal firms 
but Japanese partners, due to the differences between the U.S. and Japan. Moreover, 
China has become the fourth largest hosting area for R&D alliances. It could be useful to 
examine more closely how China, the largest emerging economy, started to surface as 
the fourth region for R&D activities in this world. 
Sixth, there is a rising group of R&D alliances – multilateral international R&D 
alliances – in today’s business world. While the number of such alliances is still limited, 
these collaborations are important considering the huge amount of financial resources 
involved. Attention devoted to most of the issues (not just partner selection) of such 
R&D alliances will be worthwhile in the future. 
Finally, the present study has not only theoretical but also methodological 
implications for alliance research. Methodologically, and also theoretically, the present 
study highlights the importance of taking a dynamic approach in the study of alternative 
knowledge protection mechanisms in R&D alliances. Most previous research has taken a 
static approach. The present study convincingly demonstrates that a simultaneous 
consideration of the decision variables provides a more accurate picture of firms’ 
 
 113
decision processes for R&D collaborations. Such dynamic methodologies should be 
applied more to strategy research to fine-tune the pictures of business reality.  
Implications for Managerial Practice 
The present study has several implications for managerial practice. First, it 
suggests that partner selection can be used as an alternative mechanism to secure firms’ 
technological assets in R&D collaboration. Such a mechanism can be used to substitute 
for other protective means such as an expensive equity-based governance structure and 
an inconvenient narrow alliance scope design. Different from the literature, this study 
suggests that it may not be desirable to choose a prior partner when the focal firm is not 
very familiar with that partner. Particularly when the R&D collaboration requires a high 
level of exposure of a firm’s technological assets, the firm should pay additional 
attention to a potential partner. If the potential partner is an Acquaintance, the firm may 
be better off to give up the collaboration opportunity rather than to pursue it at the risk of 
appropriation of its technological assets. 
Second, it may not be wise to apply the same management logic to alliances that 
involve multiple partner firms. When the collaboration is not directly between two firms, 
it is difficult, and sometimes impossible to monitor what partners are doing. This is true 
whether they contribute what they suppose to contribute to the collaboration and whether 
they take advantage of other partners in the alliance or not. Careful selection of partners 
in such a complicated group may be the first cautious step that firms can take. While 
equity-based governance may also be useful, the lack of direct monitoring makes the 
punishment of shirking partners difficult.  
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Finally, in today’s global economy, it is tempting to enter attractive countries to 
search for R&D “gold mines.” It is also tempting to partner with several firms involved 
in such “gold mines” located in other countries to share risks. However, while watching 
out for external risks in the foreign market, it is crucial for partner firms to look inside 
and check their partners and their behavior.  
LIMITATIONS  
The present study has several limitations.  
First, the measurements of Friend and Acquaintance are coarsely grained. I 
empirically defined that Acquaintances are prior partners with which a firm has had one 
alliance during the past 5 years, and that Friends are prior partners with which the firm 
has had more than one alliance during the past 5 years. There is no doubt that one prior 
relationship may build up strong trust between partners while three or four unimportant 
collaborations may still be unable to convince partner firms to trust each other. Also, the 
time duration of prior relationships is coarsely grained in the present study. While some 
alliances barely survive through the honeymoon stage, others may last over tens of years 
(Levinthal & Fichman, 1988). Empirical difficulty prevented me from advancing the 
measurements of Acquaintances and Friends. However, the current measurements do 
represent the first endeavor in pushing forward relevant research. 
A second related limitation of the present study concerns the limited numbers of 
non-conventional international R&D alliances in the sample. DRDA and TRDA are 
increasing in number as shown in Figure 9.1; the sum of DRDA and TRDA rose from 
8% in 1994 to 40% in 2003. However, the overall portion of non-conventional form of 
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international R&D alliances is merely 11% in my sample. This prevents the utilization of 
advanced statistical tools to further analyze the data. However, the present study did 
demonstrate that the non-conventional forms of international R&D alliances are on the 
rise and more attention from scholars should be devoted to questions associated with this 
phenomenon.  
FIGURE 9.1.  
Trends in Non-conventional International R&D Alliances  
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Thirdly, the present study takes knowledge sharing as given and only focuses on 
knowledge protection. Apparently, during the formation stage of an R&D alliance, 
decisions on partner selection, govern structure and alliance scope are made based on 
both knowledge sharing and knowledge protection. Generally speaking, knowledge 
sharing is of the higher priority than knowledge protection in a R&D alliance because 
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knowledge sharing and knowledge generation are the goals of such collaborating 
relationships. Yet, when the R&D alliance requires a higher degree of knowledge 
exposure to ensure sharing and creating, knowledge protection may rise to a higher 
priority because losing core technological assets means not only losing in the alliance, 
but also losing in the market. However, considering the lack of study of knowledge 
protection, this dissertation chose to emphasize this aspect and leave the simultaneous 
consideration of knowledge sharing and knowledge protection to future studies.  
Lastly, the present study emphasizes the moderating effects of multilateralism on 
the relationships between partner selection and innovation radicality and intellectual 
property protection. However, the relationships among partner selection, multilateralism, 
innovation radicality and intellectual property protection may be much more 
complicated than what is examined in this study. Specific preferences about partner 
selection in multilateral R&D alliances may be caused by innovation radicality and 
intellectual property protection, as predicted in this dissertation. At the same time, the 
formation of an R&D alliance involving multiple players may be directed by the radical 
innovation the alliance intends to develop or the weak protection of intellectual property 
that the external market is able to offer.  
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APPENDIX A 
LIST OF INDUSTRIES AND THEIR 4-DIGIT COMPONENTS 
SIC CODE INDUSTRY NAME 
HIGH-TECH MANUFACTURING 
Computers and Office Equipment 
3571 Electronic Computers 
3572 Computer Storage Devices 
3575 Computer Terminals 
3577 Computer Peripherals 
3578 Calculating and Accounting Machines 
3579 Office Machines 
Consumer Electronics 
3651 Household Audio and Video Equipment  
3652 Phonographic Records and Prerecorded Tapes and Disks 
Communications Equipment 
3661 Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus 
3663 Radio and TV Broadcast and Communications Equipment 
3669 Other Communications Equipment 
Electronic Components and Accessories 
3671 Electron Tubes 
3672 Printed Circuit Boards 
3675 Electronic Capacitors 
3676 Electronic Resistors 
3677 Electronic Coils, Transformers, and Inductors 
3678 Electronic Connectors 
3679 Other Electronic Components 
Semiconductors 
3674 Semiconductors and Related Devices 
Industrial Electronics 
3821 Laboratory Apparatus 
3822 Environmental Controls 
3823 Process Control Instruments 
3824 Fluid Meters and Counting Devices 
3825 Instruments to Measure Electricity 
3826 Laboratory Analytical Instruments 
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3829 Other Measuring and Controlling Devices 
Photonics 
3827 Optical Instruments and Lenses 
3861 Photographic Equipment and Lenses 
Defense Electronics 
3812 Search and Navigation Systems, Instruments, and Equipment 
Electromedical Equipment 
3844 X-Ray Apparatus and Tubes and Related Irradiation Apparatus 
3845 Electromedical and Electrotherapeutic Apparatus 
HIGH-TECH SERVICES 
Communications Services  
4812 Radiotelephone Communications 
4813 Telephone Communications 
4822 Telegraph and Other Message Communications 
4841 Cable and Other Pay Television Services 
4899 Other Communications Services 
Software and Computer-related Services 
Software Services 
7371 Computer Programming Services 
7372 Prepackaged Software 
7373 Computer Integrated Systems Design 
Data Processing and Information Services 
7374 Computer Processing and Data Preparation 
7375 Information Retrieval Services 
7376 Computer Facilities Management Services 
Rental, Maintenance, and Other Computer-Related Services 
7377 Computer Rental and Leasing 
7378 Computer Maintenance and Repair 
7379 Other Computer-Related Services 
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